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Abstract 
In this paper, I analyze the political legitimation of Russian President Vladimir Putin 
through sexualized media avenues and the resulting challenges this poses to producing effective 
women's policy. I examine the spectacle of Putin and the Duma in their handling of womens’ 
public health and economic issues, as well as female representation in spheres of power, by 
continuing the Soviet tradition of symbolic submission. I seek to answer the question of how 
these widely-produced images of the ​nastoyashiy muzhik​, the real Russian man, influence 
political consciousness in contemporary Russia; and determine whether there are inroads to 
policy change outside of submission to the Kremlin.  
Contemporary Russia has seen arduous regime change and economic upheaval––from the 
traumatic reorganizing of society’s systems under Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms, to 
the instability of the Boris Yeltsin years, to Putin’s ascendance to power. Gender roles and the 
fulfillment of their performance, specifically the machismo of the male head of state and 
obligatory submission to his government, have maintained a continuous role in defining 
contemporary power and stability.  
I hypothesize that policy-enforced gender inequality runs parallel to the machismo image 
of contemporary Russian power, and that this image has been woven through the political history 
of Russia as it stands today, emboldening its performative political relationship to women. I 
hypothesize that the concept of the “ideal,” submissive political woman is not gone and is central 
to the treatment of women and women’s issues in Russia’s political culture today. 
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The term “performativity” here is taken from the gender studies context, meaning the 
active (be it unconscious or conscious) fulfillment of the performance of gender. This is best 
illustrated by philosopher and gender theorist Judith Butler in her work ​Performative Acts and 
Gender Constitution. ​Butler suggests that gender is a compliance with long-running norms and 
patterns of behavior: “gender is an act which has been rehearsed, much as a script survives the 
particular actors who make use of it,” and that ultimately “the performance is effected with the 
strategic aim of maintaining gender within its binary frame. Understood in pedagogical terms, 
the performance renders social laws explicit.”  In ultra-patriarchal regimes, this is amplified by 1
the act of submission. This relates to the ‘slave soul’ mentality: Slavic studies scholar Daniel 
Rancour-Laferriere writes that among the peasantry, “a daughter was expected to be obedient to 
her father until he married her off, whereupon she was required to submit to the will of her 
husband.”  The use of the term “porn” in the title refers to the definition by legal scholar 2
Catherine MacKinnon and feminist writer Andrea Dworkin––entailing “graphic sexual 
explicitness” and “the subordination of women”  as well as a long list of sexual acts. In this 3
work, the subordination I refer to comes from the state. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 ​Judith Butler. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory." 
Theatre Journal, ​vol​. ​40, no. 4 (1988): 526  
2 ​Daniel Rancour-Laferriere, ​The Slave Soul of Russia: Moral Masochism and the Cult of Suffering, ​(New York: 
NYU Press, 1995): 134 
3 James Lindgren, “Defining Pornography,” ​University of Pennsylvania Law Review, ​vol. 141, no. 4 (1993): 1157  
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Introduction  
At the Moscow funeral ceremony of the famed Soviet dissident Lyudmila Alexeyeva, 
President Vladimir Putin made an entrance with flowers, laid them by her casket, and sat beside 
her son, Mikhail.  
This was not the first time Putin brought Alexeyeva flowers. On a personal visit to her 
Moscow apartment on her 90th birthday, he came with a bouquet. This was filmed and televised: 
they exchanged words about Alexeyeva’s legacy. Alexeyeva used this platform to ask for mercy 
for Igor Izmestyyev, a former senator who faced life imprisonment on unclear grounds. Putin 
said he would see what could be done. 
A founding member of the Moscow Group of Assistance to the Implementation of the 
Helsinki Agreements in the USSR––also known as the Helsinki Watch Group––Alexeyeva had 
been calling for accountability in the Soviet Union on an international scale since 1976. Her 
prominent role in criticizing the Soviet leadership transformed her into a human rights icon. 
Before taking a position of dissent against the Soviet system, Alexeyeva was studying Soviet key 
figures as a public lecturer. She hosted popular lectures in Moscow, attracting crowds as large as 
500 people. 
Most prominently, she lectured about the war heroine Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, 
colloquially referred to as “Zoya.” A posthumous recipient of the Hero of the Soviet Union 
award, Zoya was a partisan fighter in German-occupied territory during World War II. Zoya was 
setting fire to what were believed to be Nazi-occupied stables. The tale goes that Nazis found 
her, hanged her and disfigured her hanging body with bayonets. She is famed for her final words, 
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“You can hang me now, but I’m not alone. There are two hundred million of us. You can’t hang 
us all, they will avenge me.”   4
Through her research, Aleexeva accidentally debunked this story. She met Zoya’s 
mother, who claimed that Zoya was turned over to the Nazis by angry Soviet farm laborers.  5
Zoya’s actions were reframed to Alexeyeva: Zoya was in the wrong territory, and the feud was 
between the Soviets themselves. Alexeyeva’s research led her to view Zoya’s canonization as 
demonstrating something deceptive in Soviet ideology, and caused her to reevaluate her own 
political consciousness, outside the pro-forma Soviet mindset. 
The Soviet woman, as a symbol, was glorified in accordance with the Soviet ideology, in 
order to represent the ideal Soviet woman as a standard for behavior and compliance within the 
system. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the image of the Russian woman as a 
national symbol has been updated and adapted by passing political moments and ambitions. 
There have been several shifts in the Russian ideology of gender: women’s status within society 
has been impacted in terms of rights and policy, and concepts of the ideal have been adjusted. 
Literature about Soviet war heroines plays an important role in Soviet ideology: heroines 
epitomized the idea that the propagating of women was synonymous with the cause of the Soviet 
system. Idealized images and symbolic people were a force for stability. The literature of the 
political moment would shape the idealized Soviet woman.  
Although the thread of hope and promise for gender equality runs through the political 
history of the Soviet Union, the path to women’s self-determination through socialism was cut 
4 Encyclopedia.com, “Zoya Kosmodemyanska, 1923-1941.” Last updated April 8, 2020. 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/women/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/kosmodemyanskaya-zoya-19
23-1941 
5 ​Lyubov Timofeeva Kosmodemyanskaya, ​Povest o Zoe u Shure. ​Lib.ru, accessed April 27, 2020. 
http://lib.ru/PRIKL/PIONERY/zoyshura.txt 
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short, along with aspiration for equal rights and freedom within society as a whole. Russian 
women were a driving force in the destabilization of the Russian Empire. Many bourgeois 
women, moved by Marxist ideology, became more politically involved in the lead-up to the 
revolution and within the revolution itself than they had been prior. Many prerevolutionary 
women joined the violent Marxist group ​Narodnoya Volya ​(The Peoples’ Will) which organized 
and participated in political terrorism. Women were behind the assassination of Tsar Alexander 
II: Vera Figner, Sophia Perovskaya and others were made famous through their participation in 
revolutionary violence. The participation of women in political violence is a testimony to the 
disbelief that the Tsarist Empire could offer real change: women were signing on to a major shift 
in their social stature which was a tenet of the revolution––the elimination of bourgeois 
womanhood. Historian Gail Lapidus writes that, “rejecting the path of legal political reform, and 
therefore the tactics and goals of bourgeois feminism, the revolutionary socialist movement 
insisted that the full liberation of women was inseparable from a larger social revolution.”  After 6
the Bolsheviks defeated the Empire, Soviet women were officially made into major symbolic 
representations of the cause and its promises––solidifying the idea that both Communism and 
equality were generally intertwined. The foundation of revolution rested on the promise for 
equality: the goal was to lay horizontal the harmful societal hierarchies from years of Tsarist 
authoritarianism, wherein women were of secondary stature and marginalized per their ethnic 
groups. The Bolsheviks, Lapidus writes, “insisted on their structural connection and proclaimed 
the achievement of ethnic and sexual equality to be inextricably entwined with the revolutionary 
reconstruction of society itself.”   7
6 Gail Lapidus, ​Women in Russia​, ed. Atkinson, Dorothy; Dallin, Alexander; Lapidus, Gail Warshovsky. (San 
Francisco: Stanford University Press, 1977): 2.  
7 Ibid. 
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Lenin called on women to participate in politics, stating that “the experience of all 
liberation movements has shown that the success of a revolution depends on how much the 
women take part in it.”  Nadezhda Krupskaya, Lenin’s wife, helped pioneer the first 8
women-centric bureaucratic institution, the ​Zhenotdel, ​meaning women’s department.  There 9
were conferences of Soviet Women, organized by Bolshevik feminist  Inessa Armand. At the 10
conferences, Lenin called on women to be active members in Soviet society.   11
However, Lenin’s new statecraft and emancipation rhetoric only went as far as the 
locations from which it was proclaimed––it did not reach the women laboring in the provinces. 
In the early days of Lenin’s regime, provincial women, going about their daily tasks did not 
know that they could be emancipated from peasant life and its traditional gender roles by joining 
the party and moving up the ranks. Lapidus writes that Lenin’s statements only scratched the 
surface, as proclamation “was only a first step in their real emancipation.” That emancipation, 
however, was complicated by “the need to inform women of their new position and to draw them 
into active participation in public life was even more fundamental and posed far greater problems 
of innovation and leadership.”   12
The position of the Soviet government on women’s emancipation was redesigned during 
the course of Joseph Stalin’s consolidation of power in the late 1920s. Stalin dissolved the 
Zhenotdel ​in 1930, saying that “the woman question had been solved.”  The position of the 13
Kremlin was contradictory to the momentum of women’s involvement and engagement that had 
8  Lapidus, ​Women in Russia​, 63. 
9 Christopher J. Ward, “Working Alone, Women on the Railway,” 71.  
10 This is a retrospective use of the word. Many historians refer to Kollontai as a feminist, though the word would 
not have been attributed to her during her time.  
11 Lapidus, ​Women in Russia, ​63.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Natasha Kolchevska, ​Angels in the Home and at Work: Russian Women in the Khrushchev Years​, 115. 
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been established prior, and Stalin was calling for a return to traditional gender roles. Lapidus 
writes, “New obligations, roles, and opportunities for women were assimilated into older values 
and patterns of behavior,” such as the woman’s return to the nuclear family (something that had 
somewhat of a makeover under Lenin), and the fight against “Western ‘interference’ create an 
amalgam of tradition and transformation”  that did not signal progress under Stalin. The 14
momentum under Lenin blended with the imperial past; emancipation became even more of a 
performance than it had been 
prior. Women were to have 
children.  
Emancipation ​qua 
performativity could be 
exemplified by the Soviet 
Women’s Committee. 
Created in 1941, their role at 
the time was, “to convince 
foreign women’s delegations 
of Soviet women’s high 
economic and political 
status.”  Despite international Soviet propaganda announcing the superior condition of the 15
Soviet woman, on the home front, Stalin furthered pronatalism, producing domestic propaganda 
that urged women to reproduce for nationalistic reasons, that their most important role was to be 
14 Lapidus, 97. 
15 Varlie Sperling, ​Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia​, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
108. 
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mothers. This message was especially prominent in the lead-up to World War II––with posters 
depicting saintly mothers with Russian ethnic features, surrounded by children—mostly her sons.
 These images of nationalistic maternity arrived in the context of the staggering death statistics 16
which shaped the prerogatives of the Soviet governments. Military casualties from World War II, 
then still ongoing, were obscured by the toll of Stalin’s terror; the respective estimated death 
counts are 11 million soldiers and 26 million Soviet citizens lost.  Thus it was necessary for 17
propaganda persuading reproduction to be pointed and sentimentally triggering, as Russia left the 
second World War in dire need of demographic regeneration. Reproduction was framed as 
patriotism, so propaganda displayed the woman in her nationally-appointed role as both 
idealistically Russian, and also as the admired object of her children and the nation.  
After Stalin’s death, there was a power vacuum, ultimately filled by Nikita Khrushchev, 
who ushered a period of Soviet history called the “thaw,” a cooling down of the remnants of 
Stalinism––without much interest in addressing the stature of women. Women’s status in Soviet 
society “remained of little interest to the dominant patriarchy, with the notable exception that it 
lifted the prohibition on abortion in 1955,”  though state propaganda highly discouraged 18
abortion, outlawed during the runup to World War II. The Kremlin’s messaging created the 
appearance that the woman question had been answered. A Soviet political scientist, Vera 
Bilshai, explained in 1959 in a state-sponsored work, ​The Solution of the Women’s Question in 
the USSR: ​“the practical experience of nations within the socialist camp clearly confirms that the 
complete liberation of women both as individuals and laborers has been attained as a result of the 
16 ​Nina Vatolina, “Glory to the Mother Heroine!” Poster. 1944. Accessed from Life.ru, ​https://life.ru/p/1227735  
17 Ishaan Tharoor, “Don’t forget how the Soviet Union saved the world from Hitler,” May 2015 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/08/dont-forget-how-the-soviet-union-saved-the-wo
rld-from-hitler/  
18 Ward, “Working Alone,” 72. 
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victory of socialism over capitalism.”  This came after years of Stalinist repression. 19
Emancipation was not that simple. 
The Thaw and post-war reconstruction meant not only rebuilding infrastructure but, 
again, rebuilding the country through reproduction. Historian Christopher Ward writes that 
women “were asked to perform equally at home and in public life, to both rebuild the home and 
family and to step into the workplace as necessary”  during the dramatic reconstruction of 20
Soviet society. Once again, women were responsible for upholding stability, but also 
demonstrating that Soviet women were emancipated through the Soviet system, when policy was 
not directly benefiting them:  
women were placed at the center of ambivalent Khrushchevian pronatalist policies aimed 
at reestablishing domestic ‘normalcy’ while also being expected to play a prominent role 
in the public sphere, for example, in workplace unions and in political and social 
organizations.   21
 
Then, in Brezhnev’s tenure, “the majority of Soviet women worked outside the home in 
addition to undertaking such responsibilities as childbearing and rearing, which the state declared 
to be the backbone of domestic society.”  Women made up 80 percent of the railway workers, 22
and the railway became the icon of Brezhnev’s reconstruction progress. During this period, 
women also bore the brunt of reconstruction through reproduction. Before beginning their shift 
each day on the railway, women had to perform this affirmation:  
I am a Komsomol woman. This gives me the right to choose my own career path. The 
Komsomol membership card is a mandate, one that opens the door to true happiness, real 
happiness both at work and leisure. I believe in Komsomol and I want to believe in me.  23
 
19 Ward, “Working Alone,” 72. 
20 Ibid, 115. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid, 73. 
23 Ibid, 75. 
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At the same time, Women were the target of widely-circulated jokes about selfish females who 
wanted free time. This Brezhnev policy was one that had a significant and palpable impact: 
“Coping with the tensions arising between different generations in overcrowded apartments was 
primarily a female problem. This was because women had a greater investment in the home and 
domestic life.”  Again, women were tasked with the majority of reconstruction, all the while 24
being met with ambivalence about their roles in society beyond reproducing and laboring. Would 
the majority male higher offices  respond effectively, or would response be a performance? 25
For some, there are gradual build-ups to opinion, or clairvoyant defining moments 
wherein their opinions crystalize. In Alexeyeva’s case, the Zoya incident made her realize more 
than ever that her views did not align with those of the party; it was her self-proclaimed moment 
in which she realized that she was a dissident.  She knew people in Moscow circles who also 26
disagreed with Soviet power, and ultimately, with physicist Yuri Orlov, Alexeyeva became a 
founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group. Alexeyeva helped to orchestrate a 
small handful of men and women openly calling for change; and as the Helsinki Watch Groups 
popped up across Soviet satellite states, she became the first of many female dissidents 
organizing in opposition to the system. 
The response to Alexeyeva and other dissidents as time has passed from the Soviet era to 
today’s Putinist authoritarianism exposes a pattern between the image of male power and 
women’s policy centered around an image of women’s submission and fecundity. Expectations 
did not always reflect reality. But demands of accountability and better policy are placated by the 
24 Lynne Attwood, “The Brezhnev Years” in ​Gender and Housing in Soviet Russia: Private Life in a Public Space​, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), 188. 
25 For numbers on women’s seats in the Duma and presence in the higher offices of the Politburo and Central 
Committee, see pages 48-49. 
26 Paul Goldberg tape archive, interviews with Alexeyeva. 
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government’s ways of creating the symbolic woman through many regimes, and both Soviet and 
modern Russia’s societal leveraging of symbolic, yet ideologically docile women.  
How do widely-proliferated images of the Russian man affect political consciousness in 
contemporary Russia? To what extent do these images jeopardize womens’ issues and seek to 
further the imbalance of gender relations? In the following chapters, I assess contemporary 
Russia’s political relationship with women’s policy by analyzing the image of Russian power as 
it relates to women, and the Putin administration’s performativity on women’s legislation.  
Putinist politics offer their own ideal: they depict the female as a sexualized pinup, the 
submissive supermodel, who is politically monogamous with amorphous Putinist ideology, who 
bears children to fix the current demographic problem. The notion of upward mobility for 
women exists in that it requires compliance with the Kremlin, and employs sexualization as a 
strategy to validate the Putin regime.  
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Chapter One. Sex for the State 
1.1 Putinism as Stability  
Condoms were not sold at Seliger, a lakeside spot 200 miles from Moscow chosen for the 
now-inactive nationalist youth group ​Nashi​ (meaning “Our People”) annual camp summit. The 
Seliger summit began in 2005 with 5,000 campers, which exploded to 15,000 by 2011.  Young 27
adults attended early morning group cardio, lectures, and met with like-thinking young adults. 
The Seliger attendees are encouraged to marry in mass weddings, buy Nashi-brand T-Shirts that 
say “I Want Three,” (as in, three children) and were encouraged to procreate in an armada of 
pink tents on a barge called the “Love Oasis.” Male opposition leaders were depicted on posters 
wearing women’s lingerie in what is called a “Red Light District” on camp base. Dissidents and 
oppositionists were depicted with their heads on sticks––one such stick portrays Alexeyeva in a 
Nazi Wermarcht cap. This is what state-funded political legitimation looks like: Putin’s cult of 
personality is consolidated and validated through Nashi––his attractiveness fortified by the 
motives of Nashi.  
Putin’s relationship with power relies on these legitimation strategies. This is 
demonstrated by the political culture that surrounds him, that wields his image as a leader: the 
culture of unitary decision-making, futility of the democratic process, and the oligarchy that 
benefits from the structure of power in Russian politics. Putin’s image has been crafted  and 28
consolidated by his allies; and furthered by interventionism and rhetoric  that confirms his role 29
as a protector. The headquarters of ​Set––​meaning Network––the youth group that followed in 
27 Valerie Sperling, ​Sex, Politics, and Putin​, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 153. 
28 ​Sam Greene and Graeme Robertson,​ Putin v. The People, ​(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), 31. 
29 ​Janet Elise Johnson and Aino Saarinen, “Twenty-First-Century Feminisms: Gender Regime Change and the 
Women’s Crisis Center Movement in Russia” in ​Signs, Vol 38, ​(Spring 2013), 548. 
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Nashi​’s wake, has walls adorned with photoshopped pictures of the leader wearing a bear pelt as 
a hat, and a shocking image of him holding a strand of DNA.  30
Putinism as it is today, however, would not have been possible without the tenure of 
Boris Yeltsin. When Yeltsin came to power in 1991, advertised as a staunch populist, he was 
seen as a possible bulwark of democratic change after almost 75 years of the Soviet system. But 
after some time, it became evident that Yeltsin would not bring the population of Russia to 
stability: his promises of returning wealth went unfulfilled, he created faulty policy and furthered 
the economic disparities posed by perestroika. 
Yeltsin introduced “shock therapy,” which suggested that the new system would mellow 
after an obligatory shock period with the deregulation of all prices. With oversight from the 
economist Yegor Gaidar, Yeltsin’s government introduced budget cuts in order to achieve fiscal 
balance. These austerity measures led to deficits and inflation, government services stopped 
serving, and unemployment was rampant throughout the country.  Oligarchs bought out state 31
companies for cheap, and their resources were sold cheaply in the international marketplace. 
Family savings were worthless: they held no value in Yeltsin and Gaidar’s economic experiment. 
As Russia scholar Fiona Hill writes, “the economy as a whole shifted from a growth and 
development orientation to pure survival. On a private level, Russian households did the same. 
But publicly there was outrage.”   32
Then came the power vested into the Presidential seat. Despite parliament pushing 
through their own drafts of a new democratic constitution, Yeltsin’s team managed to forward a 
30 Voice of America, “Pro-Kremlin Youth Group Creatively Promotes ‘Patriotic’ Propaganda,” ​YouTube, ​January 
25, 2015. ​https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=MABie5BU7yA 
31 Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, “Boris Yelstin and the Time of Troubles” in ​Mr. Putin: The Operative in the 
Kremlin,​ (Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 18. 
32 Ibid, 18. 
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draft that gave the presidential seat domestic and foreign policy power, and “retroactively 
legitimized many of the steps he had taken (excluding the military action) to curb the powers of 
parliament.”  Thus, Russia was pivoting from a promise of democracy to a governing policy that 33
upheld unitary executive power. 
Chaos, poverty, and crisis was the mood of the Yeltsin administration; this atmosphere 
was responsible for creating the modern oligarchy. The word “embarrassing” is often used to 
describe his tenure. As he 
ascended to power in 2000, 
Putin was packaged and sold 
as the savior of Russia, 
promising to end what 
Yeltsin’s critics called “the 
time of troubles.”  The 34
Kremlin acts as the craftsman 
of the Putinist image––and 
with its control of news and 
media, Putin’s strongman 
image is propagated to seem much larger than life––the quintessential Russian man. 
Photos released and curated by the Kremlin and state-affiliated groups show Putin in 
action, and proclaim support. Among the many examples is the 2010 birthday calendar  (above) 35
33 Hill and Gaddy, ​Mr. Putin, ​21. 
34 A reference to the leaderless days of old Russia, 1598-1613,​ ​before the Romanovs’ Empire began. 
35 ​Left reads: “Vladimir Vladimirovich, every man should be like you.” Right: “Vladmir Vladimirovich, how about 
a third time?” Accessed from NY Daily News: 
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gifted to him by students and alumni of the journalism department of Moscow State University. 
In this calendar, women model underwear, and each has a speech bubble declaring their love for 
Putin, who is referred to by his first name and patronymic, Vladimir Vladimirovich. This project 
“served not only to publicly assert Putin’s support from a group of young women but also to 
highlight Putin’s machismo.”  British supermodel Naomi Campbell interviewed Putin for ​GQ 36
Magazine​, and of the calendar he said: 
I like the girls a lot, they're beautiful. I like the calendar but it's not the most important 
thing. As for the other one, well, in almost any country, probably in Russia in particular, 
it's fashionable to criticise people in power. If you come out in support of someone like 
me, you're going to be accused of trying to ingratiate yourself. The girls in the erotic 
calendar were courageous and they were not scared. As student journalists, they couldn't 
fail to understand what might have been said to them after doing this. Nonetheless, they 
were not deterred and did the calendar anyway. So, frankly, that's what I liked the most.  37
 
Russia historian Valerie Sperling notes that sexualization and gender norms become tools 
of both the pro-Putin groups and the oppositionist groups: the tools and rhetoric are deployed 
from either side. Activists on both sides “have chosen to wield concepts of femininity, 
masculinity, and homophobia (heteronormativity) as tools in their political organizing efforts.” 
Sperling continues, “political actors incorporated gender norms in their authority-building 
‘toolboxes’ because of the accessibility and resonance of these aspects of cultural identity at elite 
and mass levels alike.”  The use of sex as a mechanism for debate is further discussed in the 38
next section, 1.3.  
https://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/happy-birthday-mr-putin-russian-college-co-eds-pose-sexy-lingerie-calenda
r-pm-birthday-article-1.191352 
36 Sperling, ​Sex, Polititcs, and Putin​, 95. 
37 Naomi Campbell, “When Naomi Campbell Interviewed Vladimir Putin,” ​GQ,​ November 11, 2017. 
https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/vladimir-putin-interview-naomi-campbell  
38 Sperling, ​Sex, Politics, and Putin​, 2. 
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In the context of women’s issues, Putin is widely portrayed as reliable and reassuring, but 
behind this veneer are sinister mechanisms for legitimation. His political legitimacy is drawn 
from the solidification of gender roles: 
One of the most frequently encountered strategies is to emphasize patriotism and 
nationalism, as the Putin regime chose to do. Nationalism and patriotism, in turn, are 
closely tied up with gender norms––perceptions about what constitutes “correct” sex 
roles about masculinity and femininity within a given national population.  39
 
This is not a passive choice: Sperling argues that nationalism and patriotism are inherently tied to 
gender norms; as nationalism and patriotism are the idealization of the state as it exists. This is 
amplified by the many media machines in the country with validating power: state television, 
newspapers, and pro-state (and partially state-funded) groups, such as Nashi. Sperling writes of 
how those responsible for making Putin’s image have “seized on a model of attractive, physical 
masculinity as a way to set Russia’s current leadership apart”  from the physicalities of past 40
leaders.  
Political ads depict Putin’s dominance, and portray him as a protector for women––but 
his campaigns sexualize women’s votes by “tapping into a common heteronormative 
understanding of gender roles whereby women seek out male lovers to protect them (from harsh 
economic realities and from possible violence and sexual predation at the hands of other men).”  41
Thus, the legitimation model taps into sinister gender issues, and calibrates national issues (such 
as the widespread occurrences and lack of legal prosecution over domestic violence) to their 
benefit.  
39 Sperling, ​Sex, Politics and Putin,​ 126. 
40 Ibid, 61. 
41 Ibid, 296. 
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The rhetoric of deeply pronatalist policies seeps into the home. Putin’s brand of 
conservative nationalism “has pushed back against sexual liberalization, reanimated by Putin’s 
campaigns to get women to have more children in order to save the nation-state.”  Herein lies 42
his manipulation of women’s policy, bolstered by his image as a protector of women: “Portrayed 
as the ‘toughest’ political figure, Putin offered the best protection from dangers visible and 
invisible; women were ‘safest’ affiliating themselves with him politically.”   43
Of course, this regime change carried vast social implications. The comfort taken in the 
idea of stability––here: gender roles––can be understood in the context of the tumultuous era that 
preceded it. Perestroika and glasnost were the centrifuges of social change in the Soviet Union: 
Soviet everyday life was turned on its head on many levels––economic, social, and political. 
There was no roadmap for the everyday Soviet person in the upheaval of all things Soviet––there 
was no universal exit strategy for the lifelong welfare system. 
1.2 Social Movements, From the Tumultuous 90s Onward  
A “brief broadening of sexuality and gender norms as the Soviet regime liberalized”  44
before Yeltsin’s ascent to office. Years of enabling rhetoric and rampant political machismo 
impeded the ability of feminist movements to gain traction and affect policy. Women’s 
movements were reluctant to call themselves feminist. Yeltsin’s and Putin’s “conservative 
nationalism” has, as political scientists Johnson and Saarinen argue, “pushed back against sexual 
liberalization, reanimated by Putin’s campaigns to get women to have more children in order to 
42 Johnson and Saarinen, “Twenty-First-Century Feminisms: Gender Regime Change and the Women’s Crisis 
Center Movement in Russia,” 548. 
43 Sperling, “Sex, Politics, and Putin,” 296. 
44 Johnson and Saarinen, “Twenty-First-Century Feminisms,” 548.  
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save the nation state.”  Yeltsin approached women’s policy with maternalism, and spoke of 45
women’s issues as those solely associated with the production of children.  
Contemporary Russian culture and social movement building cannot be understood 
without the dissident movement of the 70s. Between Krushchev’s Thaw and Gorbachev’s 
perestroika, the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group was created. The United States and the Soviet 
Union had forged a contract, wherein they became signatories so that they could trade again. 
Yuri Orlov, a physicist who had always been on thin ice with the KGB, had read the Helsinki 
Accords published in full in ​Pravda ​and had seen the potential for implementing his movement 
as an “assistance group” in 1975. He had asked Alexeyeva to join him in this. She became the 
backbone of the group, and her name later became a metonym for the movement. The Soviet 
human rights groups were often nicknamed by Western media the “dissidents.” Here, it is 
necessary to note the difference between outspoken dissent and passive dissent. Helsinki Watch 
was outspoken––they organized publicly (as well as took to means such as publishing ​samizdat 
and having private meetings) to express dissent from the government’s choices––while passive 
occurs in the minds of people as a personal state of disagreement. There are stages of dissent, 
and there are discrete dissenting actions performed by individuals unwilling to be publicly 
identified as dissidents. 
At this same moment, society saw a rebirth of the women’s councils that had died out in 
the 1920s, the ​zhensovety. ​The purpose of those unions was to be “transmission belts.”  They 46
were “to engage women’s support of Communist Party policies, and also took on service 
provision.” But on the whole, the office was not a legal organization concerned with women’s 
45 Johnson and Saarinen, “Twenty-First-Century Feminisms,” 548.  
46 Sperling, “Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia,” 108 
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rights––rather, it reinforced performative roles that had suffused previous eras. Zhensovety and 
the Soviet Women’s Council were not considered to be “defending women’s rights, or increasing 
women’s involvement in political or economic decisionmaking.”  47
This ran parallel to the newly-attained ability to organize. On perestroika, Alexeyeva 
wrote: “no one could have predicted that his policies in the Kremlin would reflect the ideas of 
our younger days.” Before perestroika, social action came with major penalties. Society had been 
deeply atomized, and any sort of organizing was illegal. Alexeyeva continued:  
Now, my contemporaries who have not rotted away in their hideouts have joined in 
perestroika. ​I wish them success. All of us shared the bitterness of the Stalin era, and that 
shared experience gives us hope that the current warming will be more than a thaw in the 
midst of winter.   48
 
Thus, perestroika gave way to group organizing, and women’s groups took this into account 
when attempting to make their own spaces under the reforms of the late 1980s that introduced 
the possibility of freedom of speech and freedom of association. Until then, Sperling writes that 
“women in the Soviet Union had been essentially voiceless.”  However, these new groups 49
advocating for transparency often did not address the nature of gender difference within political 
struggle.  
In the dissident movement’s peak in the 1970s, there was a profound current toward 
equality and global attention to human rights-based accountability. Women’s rights were 
conflated with human rights: this was not unfamiliar to the Soviet tradition of binding women’s 
rights to the revolution. Within that context, the dissident movement did not have any special 
47 Sperling, “Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia,” 108. 
48 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, ​Soviet Dissent: Organizing Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights, 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1987), 7. 
49 Sperling, ​Organizing Women​, 5. 
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projects that addressed the issue of gender inequality. When asked about her beliefs in feminism, 
Alexyeva responded that fighting for women’s rights and fighting for human’s rights were the 
same thing.  
But her criticism did not stray from calling the moment for what it was. In this new 
political space, social movements and groups formed as their own atoms in a space of general 
chaos and economic insecurity. In her book ​Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for 
National, Religious, and Human Rights, ​Alexyeva writes of social movements in 1984:  
Previously amorphous political dissent had crystallized into several trends, including 
political ones, a majority of them transitional between those that are political and those 
that lead away from it. As a result of the physical removal from social activism of the 
activists of the early phase of dissent, and as a result of its own politicization, the moral 
potential of dissent was lowered. The dispersal of the human rights movement led to an 
accentuation in the national movements of egoistic, chauvinistic and xenophobic moods, 
and, in the religious movements, of a move away from concern about social problems.   50
 
Alexeyeva makes the argument that the authorization of social movements thus lowered their 
moral power––and that dissent itself was politicized to further self-interest rather than larger 
social issues of the moment. Social upheaval and social change were linked in unfortunate 
circumstances: the women’s movement in Russia sought to “achieve a variety of cultural, 
political, and economic goals while suffering from insufficient resources and internal divisions 
and conflicts between activists.”   51
There was space to build change and reliability, to be heard, but it was happening at the 
same time as the nation was going through a shocking shift. This challenging reality brought to 
light the social realities at hand, and mobilized people to think in a larger social context: “the 
changing economic situation and the stark appearance of unemployment, especially among 
50 Alexeyeva, ​Soviet Dissent​, 452. 
51 Sperling, ​Organizing Women​, 18. 
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educated women, brought discrimination into the open, fueling changes in consciousness for 
activists, and possibly for women in the population at large.”  Thus, people mobilized according 52
to their own beliefs on gender equality and social change: “Women activists across the political 
spectrum began to organize in their own interests, separately from men.”   53
Several glasnost-era women’s magazines began to talk about patriarchal politics. In 1991, 
Moskvichka, ​a women’s magazine with a circulation of 175,000 printed valuable statistics on the 
amount of women in leadership roles in the new economy, the small percentages on upward 
mobility within jobs, and even percentages on women who were overqualified for their jobs. 
Many women’s magazines popped up, and discussed similar issues, such as ​Delovia zhenshina 
(meaning Businesswoman), ​Novaya zhenshina ​(New Woman).  Women’s studies as an 54
academic possibility was opened, despite some opposition from academics and institutions. 
There had been past literature on gender roles in the USSR, a “huge outpouring in the 1970s of 
candidate degree dissertations on the position of women in the USSR,” but it did not disseminate 
as widely as the short-lived magazines. The idea of women’s studies, writes historian Mary 
Buckley, “had always smacked of ‘bourgeois feminism,’ and had thus been ideologically 
unsound.” But their conversation was not universal, as the pressure of perestroika was taxing to 55
those raised in Soviet mindsets. Many women, “worn out from the pressures of daily life, 
remained indifferent to new discussions of gender roles.”  Decades of the Soviet Union’s 56
demonization of feminism––and the absence of a women’s right’s movement to criticize 
52 Sperling, ​Organizing Women​, 57. 
53 Ibid, 57. 
54 Ibid, 81. 
55Mary Buckley, ​Perestroika and Soviet Women​, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1992: 7. 
56 Ibid. 
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them––made this seem normal. Again, even popular and provocative dissidents did not call 
themselves feminists.  
Valentina Konstantinova, one of the first activists to label herself a feminist, wrote of the 
importance of the vacuum created by perestroika; this, she believed, was a moment to organize 
en masse, and a time of potential for immense social change. Konstantinova, though, wrote that 
not enough movement towards progress was being made by those passive to the cause: “We 
must admit that women have so far not made use of this historic opportunity to change their 
status. We must take into consideration that gender relations in politics are tied to gender 
relations in other fields.”  Many people were talking about the possibility of change, but not 57
enough movement was being made.  
Sperling writes of a meeting of a 1995 perestroika womens’ discussion group called ​Klub 
Garmoniya––​Club Harmony. This was one of many small groups that took on issues of social 
change, “reclaiming their ‘femininity’ in a post-totalitarian world –– one whose ideology did its 
best to eliminate gender distinctions, while in reality it reinforced women’s sense of inferiority in 
all areas of life: politics, society, the economy, the home.”  ​Klub Garmoniya​ and other groups 58
like ​Feminist Alternative, ​and ​Klub F-1 ​(First Feminist Club), had no cultural preparedness for 
the task of movement building outside of government structures, but they held actively-attended 
consciousness-raising meetings about feminism.  However, it was not so much about generating 59
actor numbers, rather, initiating change through avenues that did not necessitate massive 
numbers.  60
57 Valentina Konstantinova, “No Longer Totalitarianism, But Not Yet Democracy: The Emergence of an 
Independent Women’s Movement in Russia,” in ​Women in Russia, ​ed. Anastasia Posadskaya Brooklyn: Verso, 70. 
58 Sperling, ​Organizing Women​, 3. 
59 Ibid, 27. 
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Sperling argued that the mid-1990s women’s movement was “flourishing, even as it 
[struggled] within its social, political, economic, historical, and international contexts.”  While, 61
in its moment it did flourish, there was a lot at hand. There was the consequence that there may 
be hope for international accountability, thanks to the leadership and the prior dissident 
movement. However, grassroots movements did not build momentum as anticipated: 
Simultaneously, the women’s movement has emerged into an actively interventionist 
international and transnational environment, which provides intellectual contacts, 
financial support, and even a degree of domestic legitimation for activists in Russia. 
Driven by the lack of an economic infrastructure to support grassroots social movements, 
women’s organizations in Russia are increasingly turning to international sources of 
support, which bring with them a host of benefits as well as unintended side effects.  62
 
The shift to democracy did not entail a smooth transition to movement-building––the social and 
economic contexts were not allowing for the smoothest of transitions toward a women’s 
movement like that of the women’s movements in Western democracies: the argument being that 
too much was going on, people were barely making ends meet, that an immense social 
movement was not on the radar. People were looking for accountable leadership.  
Sex and sexuality became a part of the open dialogue of the perestroika and 
postperestroika periods. In her 1994 essay ​The Mythology of Womanhood, ​Olga Lipovskaya 
writes: “Women are now no longer forbidden to be sexy––on the contrary, their sexuality is 
much encouraged.” Sexiness is encouraged because, Lipovskaya argues, it is deeply rooted in 
patriarchal culture: “Together with the image of good wife and mother, this model is now being 
promoted as the real, feminine woman so dear to Russian male culture.”   63
61 Sperling, ​Organizing Women​, 14. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Olga Lipovskaya, “The Mythology of Womanhood in Contemporary Soviet Culture,” in ​Women in Russia, ​1994 
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These images cut even deeper, according to Lipovskaya. The Soviet system, though 
performative in its promises of equality, was able to offer women some benefits. The commercial 
moment did not do so: “Having stripped women of the military uniform and modest suits of the 
totalitarian past, our culture is now creating a conventional image of compliant, sexualized 
femininity so dear to men’s hearts––submissive, tender or passionate, as the client orders.”   64
The Kremlin has since changed course about how to respond to this kind of open 
dialogue. Putin’s first-term chief political adviser Gleb Pavlovsky (fired in 2011) was quoted as 
saying: “The Kremlin tended to see its role as preventing [dissent] from emerging––avoiding 
‘public excitement’––and thus maintaining the loyalty of all but the most marginal social 
groups.”  This was updated toward the end of 2011:  65
the Kremlin recognized that [suppressing opposition] was no longer working, and it soon 
set out to create and manipulate ideological cleavages to its own advantage. The goal was 
to find issues that could ‘weaponize’ an existing but dormant social consensus against the 
opposition to the advantage of the regime. This is an old political technique, commonly 
used in Western democracies, that political strategists refer to as mobilizing ‘wedge 
issues’––issues that are not central to the usual axes of political competition, but that can 
cleave off part of an opponent’s potential support. And in Russia, as elsewhere, wedge 
issues mean bringing up the previously unmentionable––religion and sexuality.   66
 
Today, demonstration laws in Russia prohibit the public from organizing “unauthorized” 
protests, much like in the Soviet era. The ban has been challenged by the internationally known 
punk-dissent band Pussy Riot, at each of their Putin-slamming concerts. Harsh punishment and 
imprisonment followed. This correlates with something Pavlovsky said in the New Left Review, 
after years of working directly with Putin, commenting on the need for such a Putinist strongman 
image by the Kremlin since Yeltsin’s 1993 bombing of the Parliament; “there has been an 
64 Lipovskaya, “The Mythology of Womanhood,” 127. 
65 Greene and Robertson,​ Putin v. The People, ​31. 
66 Ibid, 32. 
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absolute conviction that as soon as the power centre shifts, or if there is mass pressure, or the 
appearance of a popular leader, then everybody will be annihilated.” Insecurity about potential 
insurrection was and remains a motivating force in Kremlin psychology. 
1.3 Making Putin Sexy and Humiliating Opposition  
In a ​Washington Post ​piece of the power of the image of Putin as a leader, Pavlovsky 
stressed the importance of image for a leader of a weak state: “We intensified Putin’s mystery on 
purpose.” He said: “You need to create an image of power.”  This reveals much about the nature 67
of his power, and the weakness of the state, that images of Putin must be curated. Taking a 
casual photo of Putin in Russia is not permitted. This says something about the staging and 
crafting of his presidential image. His images proliferate through the media and convey national 
stability and other moralistic messages. Externally, they convey Russia’s stance as a superpower, 
interventionist, and a force to be reckoned with.  
Sperling writes of sexualization’s association with materialism:  
The sexualization of economic products starting in Russia in the 1990s helped lay the 
groundwork for the sexualization of political products, such as candidates and their 
supporters. During the Putin era, the gender norms relied upon for advertising and image 
making in the economic sphere crossed into the political realm.   68
 
By this token, images of women in leadership positions do not proliferate in the same way. In the 
Duma, the strongest image is of staunch Senator Elena Mizulina––who dresses very 
conservatively in pearls and skirt suits, and touts the importance of conservative values; an 
ideology that has shifted with time and opportunity,  like the waves between open dialogue and 69
67Anton Troianovski, “Branding Putin: How the Kremlin turned the Russian president into a global icon.” 
Washington Post, ​July 12, 2018. ​https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/putin-brand/  
68 Sperling, ​Sex, Politics, and Putin,​ 60. 
69 ​Senator Elena Mizulina is further discussed in Chapter 2.  
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social conservatism. Sex politics are welcomed by the Kremlin––as long as they employ sex as 
an inroad to furthering Putinism. Mizulina represents a brand of conservatism which appears to 
be in contest with that of the women in Putin’s birthday calendar––but they work in concert with 
each other, in that they are politically monogamous with Putin’s administration. 
Additionally, images of dissidents are highly sexualized. With “Red Light District” of 
Seliger camp alongside the images of dissidents on sticks in fascist attire, Putinist criticism has 
commercial value when it meets its willing audience. Thus, if one does not fit in with the Putin 
brand with their dialogue, one does not fit at all.  
While the government uses sexuality to advance its practices, so do the dissidents––but 
their intentions are to subvert the Kremlin. An overt example is Pussy Riot’s 2008 orgy video, 
filmed in protest of interim-President Dmitri Medvedev’s call for families to have more children 
in order to fix the demographic problem.  Medvedev was at the time the Presidential candidate 70
for United Russia ––the Duma party which backed Putin until it was dissolved in 2020 as a 
strategy for continuing Putin’s tenure. The orgy strategically waged the rhetoric they expected to 
be waged against them, to the figures in power who employ it; demonstrating a lack of fear of 
retaliation. Pussy Riot founder Nadezhda Tolokonnikova was pregnant at the time of the filming, 
and to make matters more ironic, the orgy was at the Moscow State Biological Museum, and the 
video was titled ​Yebis’ za naslednika Medvezhonka ​(“Fuck for the Heir Teddy-Bear”). The 
Kremlin’s wielding of sexual image comes with an overt desire to advance conservative gender 
values, to show the activities of the real Russian man, and send them through the media. Images 
of Putin, shirtless, riding a horse, come with their own political agenda. Therefore, the 
70 Sperling, ​Sex, Politics, and Putin, ​154. 
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obsequious, ironic elements of the orgy video carried massive rhetorical significance, subverting 
the Kremlin’s expectations of social behavior and submission. Making sex––group sex at that––a 
political protest that challenges pink tents for the nationalist ​Nashi ​newlyweds to procreate. 
The “ideal,” then, maintains its place in Russian political culture through this kind of 
media saturation. This connects with the failure to adopt effective women’s policy by creating 
the ideal, passive pinup. Thus, if you do not fit into the ideal subordinate, there is no place for 
you. 
The images that have been woven through state media since the Soviet era have created 
model citizens whose needs cannot be addressed by the government. They can be met through 
adapting to subordination, or even bargaining within the system. Idealized imagery is a 
soft-power tool to subordinate real life––they operate as a Potemkin Villages to model something 
that is not present within society, something missing; and to placate real needs and real 
problems; proposing short-term or unreal solutions to real problems.  
With Putin’s ascendance to power came a return, once again, to women’s traditional 
roles. From the still-present cultural memory of perestroika came many social movements, and 
some liberalization of gender and sexual norms. Political scientists Janet Elise Johnson and Aino 
Saarinen write of the power of his public image, which relies on “using his own brand of 
masculinity to embolden the national psychology and to legitimate more muscular intervention 
into all aspects of people’s lives.”  Putin’s government has crafted the look and behavior of the 71
ideal Russian man after Putin himself.  
71 Johnson and Saarinen, “Twenty-First-Century Feminisms,” 548. 
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The landscape of gender roles in Putin’s government policies and reforms, Johnson and 
Saarinen write, “is a gender ideology similar to the materrnalist script employed under Yeltsin, 
albeit newly fortified with pronatalisms, the language of self-help and neoliberal individualism, 
and Orthodox Christian Nationalism.”  Russia, from Brezhnev onwards, has been concerned 72
“that the emancipation of women (such as it was) had feminized and weakened men.” In place of 
Soviet heroines and symbols came a focus on heroic men in the period of transition: “there were 
prominent stories of heroic masculinity, exceptional real Russian men who had done the 
impossible for their nation.”  The patriarchal values of Soviet society are correlated to the 73
legacy of Soviet gender role expectations. Historian and Gender Studies scholar Ludmilla 
Popkova argues that “researchers should pay more attention to the subjective and discursive 
constraints on women’s political choices from a perspective of post-Soviet cultural transition.”   74
The order of Soviet society in the transition from perestroika to the present moment 
required the adjustment from explicit gender roles to implicit ones. Popkova writes that the state, 
during the Soviet era, “institutionalized a distinctive order in which the roles of men and women 
were defined according to the needs of the communist state. The state-prescribed Soviet gender 
order had a significant impact on the subjective perceptions of men and women.”  This has not 75
been undone with time. The way in which the state has constructed the ideal human, both Soviet 
and post-Soviet, illustrates the legacy of the ideal within Soviet culture. With every new leader, 
72 Johnson and Saarinen, “Twenty-First-Century Feminisms,” 547. 
73 Ibid, 548. 
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gender roles have been molded to fit the issues of the moment. As for Putin, he has restored 
traditional values by appealing to idealized sexuality. 
This has worked intergenerationally and across several contexts within gender identity 
and sexual preference. Popokova writes:  
Many researchers have shown that the gender identities even of the younger generation 
are still strongly influenced by Soviet values. There are certain common themes in their 
perceptions of women’s roles. These include the acceptance of supposedly natural sexual 
differences, which leads to perceiving a woman’s secondary position in all spheres as 
natural. Sociological surveys show that despite negative assesments of their chances in 
the labor market in politics, women rarely claim that they face discrimination.  76
 
The patriarchal system leaves no room for an honest reckoning with contemporary women’s 
issues. Scholar and former director of the Moscow Center for Gender Studies, Olga Voronina 
writes in her 1993 essay, ​Soviet Patriarchy: Past and Present, ​“In the framework of a patriarchal 
culture, a strong man can exist only in conjunction with a weak woman; her weakness is the 
basis of his strength.”  This is exactly what idealized images of gender roles seek to do. It’s as if 77
Putin is Russia’s one and only role model: 
 
Patriarchy, the masculinist paradigm, is a system of standardization of the individual 
through gender, the ascription and prescription to a person of certain sexual parameters in 
behavior, thought, feeling and perception. This relates to men as well, who are likewise 
not free from gender prohibitions (for instance, the open expression of feelings) or 
prescriptions (always to be active and successful). In the framework of a patriarchal 
culture, a strong man can exist only in conjunction with a weak woman; her weakness is 
the basis of his strength. For all intents and purposes, the patriarchal culture creates the 
woman as a victim and the man as an aggressor, but both the one and the other suffer 
from this.”   78
 
Voronina argues that patriarchal culture breeds a system that subjugates the sexes to be 
organized within society. With the strongman image comes the image of the woman who is 
76 Lyudmilla Popkova, “Women’s Political Activism in Russia,” 173-4. 
77 Olga Voronina, “Soviet Patriarchy: Past and Present” ​Hypatia, ​vol. 8, no. 4 (Fall 1993):​ ​111. 
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unable to be as strong. This is in association with something said by Pavlovsky, Putin’s former 
image-maker, that the image of a leader of a weak and challenged state needs to be that of a 
strongman.  
Society has not seen a female leader of similar stature in the modern era. Female leaderly 
images, like that of senator Mizulina, are prim and pearl-wearing, conservative––in a state organ 
that puts forth hard-line policies that do not prioritize gender equality.  
Per Pavlovsky, the wielding of image in a weak state is important to the state’s internal 
and geopolitical stability. Putin’s brand is part of a careful, patriarchal playbook. Highly defined 
sex roles are a state necessity. Those that contribute to his branding through various campaigns, 
youth groups, and the like weave these roles into the fabric of government. 
1.4 Commercializing Legitimacy 
Creating media featuring women as prizes, depicting supermodel-like women making 
gifts of themselves for Putin, is a popular way of aligning oneself with the state and gaining 
respect of peers. Sycophants buy into Putin’s affections through the creation of media that 
features him as desired, or sexualizes him. As discussed in the introduction, the Putin birthday 
calendar is a case in point. Groups of women, aligned to the image of supermodels with 
ethnically Russian features, like “Putin’s Army” and the “Medvedev Girls”  are examples of 79
this. These widespread gimmicks carry their own agendas; and many have state funding.   80
Nashi ​ran a state-funded ad campaign for Putin in the 2012 elections, depicting a woman 
seeking advice on “doing it” for the first time, saying that she needed to be sure it was with a 
79 Sperling, ​Sex, Politics, and Putin​, 99. 
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man she cared about, who would treat her right.  It became clear that “doing it” meant voting. 81
Each person from whom the woman sought advice told her that she had made the right choice, 
that she “would be ‘safe’ with the man she chose.”  82
In 2013, when Medvedev was interim President, he signed a bill banning public alcohol 
consumption, specifically beer sold in park kiosks, and the Medvedev Girls responded with a 
campaign in a public park where they had men pour out cans of beer into a bucket. The higher 
liquid in the bucket got, the more items of clothing the Medvedev Girls took off.   83
This propaganda in its many forms acts as a legitimation tool for the state. Though the 
state does much of its own legitimation, this kind is legitimation at a remove, that evokes a sense 
of stability within an otherwise insecure political leadership.  Sperling writes about glamour’s 84
role in modern Russia, stressing the value of this kind of gift:  
Glamour played well in the new capitalist economy, though it would rise to the fore in 
politics only after Yeltsin’s exodus, when Putin evolved into something of a glamour 
object. Putin became ‘a major––indeed, perhaps the ultimate––sex symbol’ of a new 
political regime resting on a new economic order. Glamour was now a selling point, and 
political leaders as well as economic goods could be desired and consumed.   85
 
Women, gifting themselves to Putin and Medvedev, locate themselves in the Putinist legitimate 
order. If sex sells, then why not capitalize? Branding oneself alongside the state becomes a 
lucrative practice. Appealing to the Putinist brand is a way for one to garner power in such a 
system. Glamour and branding that validates the government is an asset to the Kremlin; which is 
why it comes as no surprise that both ​Nashi ​and ​Set ​had their own fashion designers. ​Set ​even 
81 Ibid​, ​296. 
82 ​YouTube,“Krasotka gadaet na pervi raz,” February 20, 2012. ​https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=Noo0lzJILaM 
83 YouTube, “Moscow. Anti-beer. Medvedev Girls vs. Putin Army 2” August 6, 2011. 
https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=zTGOlFmJ6zY 
84 Julia Ioffe, “Surreal Politik,” ​Foreign Policy,​ August 11, 2011. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/11/surreal-politik/ 
85 Sperling, ​Sex, Politics, and Putin, ​62. 
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held a 2015 fashion show, displaying attire by “patriotic designers.”  Defense Minister Sergei 86
Shoygu thought to create a brand to popularize the military and generate a fanbase. This resulted 
in the outlet store, ​Armiya Rossii.  The marketing of patriotism taps into cultural memory and 87
emotion. For the younger patriots, it markets sex and war as excitement. Such commercial excess 
is no problem to the Kremlin when it validates the state, and effectively generates propaganda at 
a remove. 
1.5 Hegemonic Masculinity 
 
Sociologists R.W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt offer a valuable tool for 
analyzing contemporary Russia through the concept of“hegemonic masculinity.” The structure 
and system of contemporary legitimation strategies can be analyzed through each of these three 
frameworks, offered by Conell and Messerschmidt: 
1. Local: constructed in the arenas of face-to-face interaction of families, organizations, and 
immediate communities, as typically found in ethnographic and life-history research; 
2. Regional: constructed at the level of the culture or the nation-state, as typically found in 
discursive, political, and demographic research; and  
3. Global: constructed in transnational arenas such as world politics and transnational 
business and media, as studied in the emerging research on masculinities and 
globalization.  88
 
Concepts of masculinity within the realm of wealth and power in Russia can be applied to the 
current hegemony of male power today through the local, regional and global distinctions. Even 
86 Howard Amos, “Corps Couture: The Rise of Russia’s Patriotic Fashion Industry,” ​The Moscow Times, ​August 15, 
2016. 
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/08/15/corps-couture-the-rise-of-russias-patriotic-fashion-industry-a54983 
87 Ibid. 
88 R.W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept,” in ​Gender and 
Society, ​no. 6, (2005): 849. 
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with the ambiguities associated with definitions of hegemonic masculinity and non-hegemonic 
masculinity, one can understand the proliferation of power with the lack of any cohesive 
pushback. Emboldened by alliance with the Russian Orthodox Church and the Putinist brand of 
leadership, hegemonic masculinity in contemporary Russia operates on each level of Connell and 
Messerschmidt’s distinctions.  
Nonetheless, it would be misleading to attribute this to “Russian culture.” Several 
analyses of Putin’s style of masculinity have shown that his chosen brand is one that is 
manicured and focus-grouped. This aligns with the concept posed by Connell and Messerschmidt 
that the masculinity at play does not necessarily have to represent all masculinities––just those 
that can benefit from spreading a masculine image, in order to obtain certain gains from 
systematic gender placements. Putin’s solidification of masculinity within Russian leadership 
runs parallel to the issue itself: the stability of the leaders’ masculine image with the perceived 
stability of his very leadership. The proliferation and popularity of Putin’s image––with the help 
of such images of him and his various adventure-seeking hobbies––display a gender performance 
used for political propaganda. Political scientist Tatiana Zhurzhenko asks in an article for 
Eurozine, ​“Can alternative masculinities in Russia point to political alternatives to Putin?”   89
Instilling normativity rather than normalcy, Putin struck a chord by addressing through 
his own hobbies and habits what society was lacking, modeling himself as the ideal to what 
Russian men ought to be. The motivating principle was that “it embodied the most honored way 
of being a man, it required all other men to position themselves in relation to it, and ideologically 
legitimated the global subordination of women to men.”  The machinery of structured gender 90
89 Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “Capitalism, autocracy, and political masculinities in Russia.” ​Eurozine. ​May 18, 2016, 
https://www.eurozine.com/capitalism-autocracy-and-political-masculinities-in-russia/ 
90 Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity,” 832. 
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roles and performances was keeping “traditional” roles in place. Such actions, and the lack of 
oversight through cohesive checks and balances, showed that gender politics in Russia could 
continue as such.  
Thus, that which is left ambiguous and unsaid is precisely what makes all the difference. 
Connell and Messerschmidt write of male images at the regional level: “There is a circulation of 
models of admired masculine conduct,” and such models can be “exalted by churches, narrated 
by mass media, or celebrated by the state. Such models refer to, but also in various ways distort, 
the everyday realities of social practice.”  These models idealize certain masculine 91
characteristics, in order to produce more of them and celebrate certain gender performances of 
masculinity over others. This can be seen in the meetings of various nationwide youth groups, 
especially in the days of the Nashi Summit at Seliger, when male campers were encouraged to 
bend cast-iron pans with their bare hands. 
The counterargument to this phenomenon is that Putin is offering a model of 
responsibility and behavior in a state where alcoholism and domestic violence run rampant. 
Incident reporting is complicated by the lack of legal protections. A study in 2014 estimated that 
every year 14,000-15,000 women were killed annually by abusive partners.  Authorities do not 92
disclose these numbers definitively and abuse statistics are likely much higher than their annual 
estimates.   93
91 Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity,” 838. 
92 Venera Zakirova, “Gender Inequality in Russia: ​The Perspective of Participatory Gender Budgeting." in 
Reproductive Health Matters ​22, no. 44 (2014):​ 203. 
93 ​Domestic violence is discussed further in Chapter 2.  
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Such ambiguity makes space for stagnant policy. With the power of hegemonic 
masculinity; policy neglect is not a symptom of such governance but a product. Connell and 
Messerschmidt write: 
Because the concept of hegemonic masculinity is based on practice that permits men’s 
collective dominance over women to continue, it is not surprising that in some contexts, 
hegemonic masculinity actually does refer to men’s engaging in toxic 
practices––including physical violence––that stabilize gender dominance in a particular 
setting.  94
 
Thus, the absence of a deeper look and analysis of women’s policy issues is problematized by 
the fact that this situation works for men in leadership positions, and perhaps even for the women 
that have taken steps to orient themselves within it. Hegemonic masculinity within the context of 
domestic violence, which will be discussed in Chapter 2, is one such problem where stagnant 
policy and the image of male power work in unison. Permitting male dominance, which the Putin 
administration has encouraged, parallels with the global appearance of Russia.  
The mass-produced images of Putin carry their own political agenda: they seek to 
impress upon people a sense of stability after years of discomfort. The images also seek to show 
one type of person: a man, with ethnically Russian features, who is sovereign in the sense that he 
can fish, he can hunt, he can even scuba-dive. He is a man who hunts, fishes, rides motorcycles 
and horses, plays hockey, engages in extreme sports, drinks in moderation if at all, attends 
Russian Orthodox church services––and acknowledges beautiful Russian women, who 
reciprocate by giving him their support. The Kremlin’s image-makers depict him as an updated 
“Real Russian Man.” That model is dependent upon the normative gender order instilling desire 
94 Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity,” 840. 
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in men to be like Putin, and for women to desire Putin. But it also seeks to subvert other modes 
of being; and impose strict gender order.  
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Chapter Two. Performative Policy and Political Vanity  
2.1 Bedroom Politics 
The function of Putin’s branding is two-fold. It works as a soft power tool to display the 
sovereignty and strength of Russia, and also as a tool for intervention into private life through 
mass media that beckons validation through normative male and female behavior––exacerbating 
the social implications of imprudent policy. Johnson and Saarinen argue that there is a 
comparison to be made between Putin’s physical appearance and his interventionism in 
post-Soviet states like his annexation of Crimea in the Ukraine, the Kremlin’s cyberattacks in 
Estonia, and the invasions of Georgia and Chechnya.  
Johnson and Saarinen categorize Russia as a “gender regime,” a government which 
evokes and furthers stratas based on gender, “from private to public, in various domains (such as 
economic, political, and civil society) as well as social relations.” They define gender regimes as 
“the constitutive structures that (re)produce gender relations.”  Governmental structures, in their 95
case, further gender norms in society, and therein affect how society interacts.  
In this tableau, Putin is cast as the protector. This image operates on the international 
scale, in that the theater of operations must look stable––Russia maintains a strongman image 
internally by intervening in surrounding states, and adopts an anti-civil-society rhetoric in the 
media. Johnson and Saarinen cite a 2010 study by political scientist Amrita Basu which asserts 
that “women’s movements are less likely to emerge when states are weak and repressive and 
there is a chasm between official pronouncements and actual politics and practices.”  Women’s 96
movements, as discussed in 1.2, have emerged in Russia, but they have issues with cohesion. The 
95Johnson & Saarinen, “Twenty-first Century Feminisms,” 550. 
96 Ibid, 543. 
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lack of an organized women’s movement is naturally beneficial to the gender regime. Without a 
cohesive feminist opposition to call out the gender regime, the gender regime can maintain its 
norms and stratifications without challenge.  
The campaign song “Man Like Putin” offers an image of Putin as a hero, a savior, an 
ideal, respectful partner. The lyrics––written by pop star Alexsandr Yelin as part of a bet––are 
derived from the fact that domestic violence is deeply prevalent in Russia, without any 
legislation that protects the victim from the perpetrator. The song, which became a cultural 
phenomenon, considers the culture of domestic violence in Russia, and offers Putin as an 
alternative to the archetypal drunk, abusive boyfriend:  
A man like Putin, full of strength 
A man like Putin, who won’t be a drunk 
A man like Putin, who won’t hurt me  
A man like Putin, who won’t run away   97
 
These lyrics address the prevalent issue of domestic violence passively, and even place the 
responsibility for the issue of domestic violence on women themselves and their deficient 
abilities to choose partners. The song suggests that women need protection from men, and that 
they should put their faith in Putin’s presidency, and cast him in the role of protector––another 
normative legitimation strategy. This became his campaign song.  
According to a 2018 Human Rights Watch report, one in five Russian women has been, 
or currently is being abused by her partner.  Domestic violence is not legally an offense in 98
Russia––there is no legal language to make a distinction between domestic violence and battery. 
Human Rights Watch wrote a policy recommendation in 2012 that the state adopt measures to 
97 PBS, “A Man Like Putin.” Accessed April 21, 2020. ​https://www.pbs.org/soundtracks/stories/putin/ 
98 Yulia Gorbunova, “I Could Kill You and No One Would Stop Me: Weak State Response to Domestic Violence in 
Russia,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2018): 22-23. 
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protect victims of domestic violence, and make partner abuse a criminal offense. After HRW 
drafted the recommendation, the organization worked with Duma officials to see that this bill 
passed. The federal offices of the Interior Ministry, as well as the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Protection approved it, and the Presidential Council on Human Rights formally recommended 
that the Duma adopt it. But in 2016, the measure stalled. An undisclosed senior official stated 
that the Duma was citing arbitrary errors, “bureaucratic pretexts, and that the committee rejected 
the draft because of a powerful pushback from religious leaders and other supporters of 
‘traditional values.’”   99
There was, however, a brief, six-month period in 2016 in which domestic violence was 
made a criminal offense, beginning in July and ending in February of 2017. This was in an effort 
to “lighten the criminal justice system’s burden.”  However, parliament fought back beginning 100
in November of 2016––a team of lawmakers led by Senator Mizulina argued for family 
sovereignty and state sovereignty––citing danger stemming from Western NGOs:  
They . . . have a very mercantile interest in promoting this agenda. The thing is, Western 
countries have grant programs for NGOs that fight domestic violence. Because of this, a 
lot of topics are being forcefully included in the political agenda. This applies not only to 
groups that receive foreign funding. Russia has a lot of its own programs on the federal 
and regional level. NGOs inflate the importance of this topic in order to increase the 
overall funds allocated to fight the problem and also as part of competition for the 
existing ones.   101
 
Mizulina subverts the problem of lax policy toward domestic violence in Russia, with the 
argument that state sovereignty is under attack by Western NGOs, which seek to destabilize 
Russia. Thus, the power of Putinist rhetoric is two-fold: it takes the real, domestic issue to the 
global scale, and then succeeds in placating it by invoking outside threats that must be stopped. 
99 ​ Gorbunova, “I Could Kill You and No One Would Stop Me,” 23. 
100 Ibid, 26. 
101 Ibid, 28. 
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Mizulina’s rhetoric called for sovereignty in the country and in the home, leveraging the 
Kremlin’s contentious relationships with international watchdogs against the new policy 
changes. The domestic programs she cited did not provide the victim with protections, and in 
certain cases victims even were legally required to pay their abusers’ battery fines. In the first 
week of February 2017, parliament adopted a bill that would decriminalize domestic violence, 
and the following week, Putin signed it into law, ending the brief period in Russia during which 
there was substantial legal recourse to domestic violence.  
Mizulina’s argument was rooted in the idea that in such a patriarchal society, domestic 
violence, when it is inflicted on a woman by a male partner, is “less” offensive than other 
behaviors:  
Mizulina suggested that women “don’t take offense when they see a man beat his wife” 
and that a man beating his wife is “less offensive” than when a woman “humiliates a 
man.” She and other parliamentarians also argued, with no evidence, that criminal 
sanctions for certain forms of domestic violence would disproportionately affect parents 
who use “spanking” to discipline their children.   102
 
The HRW report did not invoke suggestive language on child discipline as part of the suggestion 
to the Russian government to improve its domestic violence policies. The argument came to 
centralize the role of NGOs as agents of Western “interference,” which the Kremlin cast as a 
threat to Russia’s sovereignty. The HRW argument was blown out of proportion. 
This is a tactic that is not only Putinist, but maintains a legacy in the history of Russian 
and Soviet leadership. The real problem of lack of equality is placated by the argument that 
foreign powers are out to destabilize Russia, and that internal politics are connected with external 
threats of intervention––especially that of Western, human rights intervention.  
102 Gorbunova, “I Could Kill You and No One Would Stop Me,” 23. 
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The Kremlin’s brand of state sovereignty relies upon the development of a strong sense 
of nationalism: Putinism relies on manufacturing support for the claim that unity on the home 
front against the rest of the world is important to the fate of Russia, and then producing the 
solution to that problem in the form of a masculine figurehead. Considering the demographic 
issue,  the call on women to reproduce, the rhetoric and policy around abortion, and the lack of 103
effective reprimand for domestic violence, invoking nationalism and patriotism makes an 
effective subversion tactic. Putin and his Kremlin allies obscure the problem and absolve 
responsibility for mishandling rampant national problem of domestic violence. The responsibility 
falls on the abused partner, and she is considered at fault, as the victim is blamed for putting 
herself in a dangerous situation. But the backdrop of abuse also works as a part of a legitimation 
strategy, which relies on the continuation of abuse to produce the image of Putin as the superior 
man. This scapegoats the violent elements of manhood to the abusive men, and casts Putin as the 
superior man.  
Putin’s policies and rhetorical stance on NGOs attack Western intervention in a similar 
way to how the West was portrayed during the height of the original Helsinki Watch Group’s 
campaign to hold the Soviet Government to international standards of conduct. The “foreign 
agent” law, aimed at any NGO that is politically analytical or critical, requires NGOs to register 
as ‘foreign agents.”  This requires scrutiny of spending and earning, and requires leaders of any 104
group that holds the government accountable to report to officials every quarter. Memorial, an 
NGO which commemorates victims of Soviet-era repression and keeps records of totalitarian 
activity, was fined 600,000 roubles ($9,000 approximately) for the distribution of their materials 
103 See 1.1 for refernce on the demographic issue.  
104 ​Laurel Wamsley, “Putin Approves Law Labeling Journalists ‘Foreign Agents’ in Russia,” ​NPR, ​December 2, 
2019. ​https://www.npr.org/2019/12/02/784220222/putin-approves-law-labeling-journalists-foreign-agents-in-russia 
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without specifying that they were “foreign agents.” Any NGO that is angled toward 
record-keeping and information sharing, that is aimed toward human rights protections, or is 
critical of the government, is labeled and persecuted by the state. While all that takes on the 
Kremlin’s international relations, internal politics and policies remain stagnant, abstracted by the 
invocation of Western interventionism.  
Johnson and Saarinen write of the effectiveness of Putinist pronatalism, that he “is using 
his own brand of masculinity to embolden the national psychology and to legitimate more 
muscular intervention into all aspects of people’s lives.”  Putin’s masculinity relies upon 105
establishing and asserting his sex appeal. Johnson and Saarinen write that such images put forth 
by the Kremlin depict “a sexualized tough guy, a new real Russian man.”  Putin’s “real Russian 106
man” image relies upon the failure of Russian masculinity in general, and the continuation of the 
domestic violence crisis. Voronina writes of the confluence of issues as private problems: 
“concerning only the ‘fair sex.’ But it is precisely here that the most important mechanism for 
the perpetuation of traditional patriarchal ideology is concealed.”  Thus, behind all of this 107
imagery––the shirtless Putin, the ideal man, the woman who picks a man for safety––patriarchy, 
machismo, gender norms and inequalities pervade with force and call people into question for 
their individual choices, and how they can better benefit the state. 
105 Johnson and Saarinen, “Twenty-First-Century Feminisms,” 548. 
106 ​Ibid. 
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2.2 Abrasive Rhetoric, and Lacking Representation 
In 2009, the head of United Russia’s political department attempted to make a point 
about economic modernization. To make this point, he made the choice to use rape as metaphor: 
“I saved a girl from being raped. I just persuaded her.”   108
Rhetoric is a powerful tool for public political legitimation. Putin’s wielding and 
deployment of a rhetoric of masculine sovereignty has been successful for his party and his 
allies, as seen in Mizulina’s statements on NGO intervention. Such rhetoric is also a tool to 
influence society. Putin wielded the language traditionally associated with men in his new 
rhetorical form, that “signaled new public legitimacy for what had been private, male-only locker 
room talk, bringing the language of the ​siloviki​—comrades from the police, military, and 
intelligence agencies—into public discourse.” This has materialized, as Johnson and Saarinen 
describe, in incidents like his first political crisis: “in summer 2000—when the Kursk submarine 
sank with a crew inside—Putin labeled some of the sailors’ wives as whores in response to their 
agitation for a government rescue operation.”  The language of fraternity thus became useful in 109
terms of shutting down dissent by posing the state and its interests in masculine terms, and 
humiliating opposition in feminine terms. This para-political tactic allows the Kremlin to 
leverage misogyny to make attacks on opponents, critics, and policy suggestions without the 
need to engage on the opposition’s own rhetorical terms. 
Voronina writes that “it has become almost improper to speak about women’s everyday 
family burdens, since this motif resounds so often (albeit without results), whenever the 
108 Johnson and Saarinen, “Twenty-first Century Feminisms,” 547. 
109 Ibid. 
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discussion turns to women and ‘their’ problems.”  In the context of the masculinized political 110
sphere and its rhetoric, the place for women’s issues and problems is not only absent, but almost 
rhetorically treated as if they aren’t a concern without a political dimension. In the backdrop of 
these rhetorical standards, advocacy for women’s issues is much harder to achieve.  
This is also legitimized through the political and cultural hegemony of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. Within the church, there is very little space made for women’s issues. This is 
emphasized through the strong enforcement of gender roles within the church, where women are 
not allowed to serve within the structure of the church as priests or clerics. Historian Nadezhda 
Kizenko writes that when women go to confess, and are seeking priestly advice on issues of 
reproduction, non-marital sex, they are seen as comitting “a crime against pastoral conscience; 
and they sow temptation among the other parishioners.”   111
The legacy of the Soviet past may appear promising on women’s representation, but 
emboldens the lack of high leadership roles occupied by women. The Supreme Soviet, the 
legislative body for the Soviet republics, there was a quota that ensured there would be 33% 
female representation.  But in the higher seats, women were lacking: only two women held the 112
ministerial seats between 1923 and 1991.  In the high offices of the Politburo and Central 113
Committee, women retained 3% representation in the full duration of the Soviet era.  114
Women in federal power are working within a context where machismo politics have 
gone unchecked. Women in the Duma are a minority: statistics from 2011 show that women then 
110 Voronina, “Soviet Patriarchy,” 100. 
111 Nadieszda Kizenko, “Feminized Patriarchy? Orthodoxy and Gender in Post-Soviet Russia” in ​Signs, ​Vol. 38, No. 
3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013): 599. 
112 Nivedita Kapoor, “Women in the Duma: Why Post-Soviet Russia Has Low Female Representation,” 
Comparative Politics, ​vol. 23, no. 2, 2016: 61. 
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occupied 61 seats in the Federal Duma, while men occupied 389 seats––making the Duma 13.5% 
per cent women.  As of 2020, women occupy 71 of 450 Duma seats. The Inter-Parliamentary 115
Union’s tracking of women’s representation in federal power has depicted Russia’s steady 
plunging down the ranks. In a list of 189 countries, the Russian Federation ranks 133rd as of data 
from March 2020, a significant plummet from 100th place in 2015.  Of 170 upper chamber 116
seats, 29 are occupied by women––making potential legislation inherently skewed and 
influenced by a male majority. 
Women’s issues, then, only exist to the degree that women are seen as responsible for 
themselves; their reproductive health, their place in issues of domestic violence, their place in 
society as a whole. Importantly, it is a confluence of “responsibility” and agency. Through the 
machinery of the Putinist power model, women are held entirely responsible for domestic 
violence, while the failures of the government to protect through policy are not broached. 
Various movements and organizations challenge existing policy, but they are met with the 
masculine derision associated with Putinist rhetoric, which demean their political demands while 
also reinforcing the dominance of the male figurehead image that Putin embodies.  
2.3 Policy suggestions: Do They Matter? 
The Kremlin has not integrated any policy suggestions generated by NGOs, i.e, the 
suggestions of Human Rights Watch in terms of domestic violence policy. These policy 
115 Inter-Parliamentary Union database, “Russian Federation State Duma.” Accessed April 22, 2020. 
http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2263_11.htm 
116 Inter-Parliamentaey Union database, “Percentage of women in national parliaments,” Accessed April 27, 2020. 
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suggestions have effectively been neutralized by casting them as extensions of Western 
intervention into Russia’s sovereignty.  
There have been experiments and attempts to ameliorate the system on  the local level: an 
internationally–implemented policy suggestion, “participatory gender budgeting,” is a tactic 
employed by over 70 countries worldwide as of 2014, and was attempted in Russia as the 117
Gender Development Strategy of the Russian Federation. International donors supported this 
process in conjunction with the Open Society Institute––hoping to put forth a playbook for 
gender equality in Russia within the systems and infrastructure of Russian bureaucracy. The pilot 
test for the program was undertaken in the Komi Republic of Russia, however, it was inevitably 
abandoned by the Putin regime. Research on the St. Petersburg state budget showed it “was not 
oriented practically to taking up gender issues,”  a claim which appears dubious in the general 118
tableau of the Putin-led government.  
This is part of a larger debate on community needs and budgeting. Gender Studies 
scholar Venera Zakirova explains that local officials are “hesitant to or afraid of encouraging 
citizen participation, as they believe it will lead to demand for more services and place additional 
burdens on already scarce resources.”  This, then, becomes a civil society issue, with the 119
government deciding social services without consulting and surveying the regions and people 
whom they serve: “Delivery of services by the municipalities and other government agencies still 
does not take account of people’s opinions or include consultations with civil society 
organizations.” The victims, Zakirova deduces, are primarily women, children, and the elderly, 
as well as large families. Zakirova cites the “top-down” approach of governance as the crux of 
117 Zakirova, “Gender Inequality,” 206. 
118 Ibid, 207. 
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this issue, as it leaves officials vulnerable to the orders of the Kremlin. Both cities and provinces 
are affected by deprivation of resources, but provinces have especially limited government 
resources. There is “limited access to health care, schools, day care centres for small children, 
hospitals or maternity clinics, let alone good roads or well-developed public transport.” Above 
two thirds of provincial households live below or at the cusp of poverty. These numbers, as of 
2018, estimate that 19.3 billion (one fifth of the population) live at or below the poverty line120
––9,786 roubles, which as of 2020 is $142.74. The tacit refusal of the Duma to entertain certain 
policy suggestions, even when tested on the local governmental level and accepted, are not 
accepted on the larger playing field of Russian politics, and then curbed altogether. 
In terms of furthering reproductive policy through lobbying, anthropologist Michele 
Rivkin-Fish writes of reproductive legislation amid Russia’s demographic crisis, positing that 
any such lobbying for women’s reproductive rights is dangerous “amid Russia’s aggressively 
nationalist demographic politics.”  The Kremlin offers, again, no room for suggestions. The 121
landscape of reproductive legislation is controlled by men, while Mizulina serves as the face of 
the anti-abortion brigade symbolically.  
 
There was, at one point, something called “maternity capital,” wherein women with new 
infants in families with more than one child were given vouchers in order to ease child rearing 
expenses. These vouchers amount to $10,000. However, this is again a placation of larger issues 
of the state, such as lack of fundamental state resources and programs. This does not affect the 
120 Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty. “One-Fifth Of Russians Live in Poverty, 36 Percent in ‘Risk Zone,’ Study 
Finds.” ​RFERL​, November 21, 2018. 
https://www.rferl.org/a/study-22-percent-of-russians-live-in-poverty-36-percent-in-risk-zone-/29613059.html 
121 Michele Rivkin-Fish, ​"Conceptualizing Feminist Strategies for Russian Reproductive Politics: Abortion, 
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quality of childcare, nor has it furthered the idea that men are contributors to domestic labor. 
These vouchers are a strategic distraction:  
Instead, it has encouraged women to exit the workforce as a solution to the presumed 
barriers impeding women from bearing second and third children. Thus, despite Putin’s 
framing of this entitlement as promoting women’s needs, maternity capital ties the state’s 
support for families closely to its own pronatalist goals, further entrenching a vision of 
women as mothers and linking them to the domestic sphere.   122
 
The vouchers, ultimately, seek to return women to the home. In the debates on the demographic 
crisis, there is a line of thought of such maternity policies as stoking a masculinity crisis and 
rendering men useless. Male humiliation based on lack of finances and small salaries operates as 
a crux of the argument against maternity capital, that “a long-standing crisis of masculinity 
stands at the root of Russia’s family crisis, including low fertility.”   123
Internal policy suggestions are more of the same pronatalist approaches to abortion. The 
demographic crisis made these internal policies exceptionally vicious. A 2011 draft legislation, 
put forth by Parliamentarian V.G. Dragonov, would have required women to recieve letters of 
permission from husbands (and underage pregnant women parental permission) to recieve 
abortions. This would also entail a 7-day wait period, “a mandatory ultrasound in which a 
woman was to see and hear the fetus’s beating heart,” and “a counseling session informing 
women about the harms of abortion and her “right to refuse” an abortion.”  The language of 124
this bill also entailed the elimination of any social needs for abortion except for a rape-induced 
pregnancy. Rivkin-Fish posits that “with ongoing support from the Orthodox Church and global 
antiabortion movements, further restrictions may emerge.” The Orthodox Church has a hardline 
stance on abortion and, even, miscarriage. Priests have women who are looking for absolution 
122 Rivkin-Fish, “Conceptualizing Feminist Strategies,” 584. 
123 Ibid, 586. 
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for the sin of abortion to do the prayer for miscarriage, laying the blame on them: “for women 
who have actually miscarried, this prayer, which essentially blames them for their child’s death 
and bars them from the Eucharist, is more devastating than the penalties for abortion itself.” The 
penalty of abortion, in Orthodox doctrine, is the excommunication of the subject for ten years.   125
Federal policies work in conjunction with the Russian Orthodox Church, and the concept 
of the patriarchy is taken on “more literally in Russia than it does in other Christian religious 
traditions.”  The Church, at the same time, furthers image of the ideal Russian man––a pious 126
man of relative sobriety. But “there was neither a context nor an audience for discussing a 
greater role for women.”  The image of women within the Church is mainly of pious, 127
conservative older women. 
Policies, then, work to please the beneficiaries of the Putin regime, with the furthering of 
bills––some which claim to be helping women, like the maternity capital bill––that seek to keep 
women in the domestic sphere. But the reality is that women are left out of the policy through 
sinister means. This is a resort to living on welfare, and being dependent on the state. 
2.4 Averting Attention: “I’m a Girl, I Don’t Want to Hear About Politics” 
State politics, though maintaining the performative appearance of inclusion, are 
notoriously a no-woman’s-land. This is both in the makeup of the Duma  and in its policies. 128
Voronina posits that 
women as a social group are, for all intents and purposes, alienated from politics, insofar 
as they are considered to have no particular political or social interest which differs from 
the interests of men, and, on the other hand, the latter are convinced that politics is 
125 Kizenko, “Feminized Patriarchy?” 598. 
126Ibid, 596. 
127 Ibid, 597. 
128 See 2.2, page 48 for reference on Duma makeup. 
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definitely not a women’s affair. Thus, it is more a case of suppression of the interests of 
women than of their over-emancipation.   129
 
This is emphasized through commercial means. In the spring of 2013, a television station called 
“You” (a play on the Russian letter Ю) materialized, a channel for women, with advertisements 
featuring CGI cats with wigs of human hair and feminine outfits. One such advertisement read, 
“I am a girl [devushka]. I don’t want [to hear about] politics. I want a channel that’s for me.”  130
The implication was the marketing message––that Russian girls and women are not needed in the 
political sphere, they can return to their shows. Similar ads by ​You​ ran about girls not being 
interested in watching sports.  
This sort of allowance within the marketplace, making such gender disparity visible, is 
deeply telling. While independent news media takes to the internet,  the space is made for 131
channel ​You​ on television.  
The degradation of women in the media and in mass culture and the discrimination in all 
spheres of life, remains not only unpunished, for all intents and purposes, but is not even 
recognized by a society that is trying to become democratic. An orientation toward 
changing the position of women is nowhere written into the humanistic and democratic 
program for the transformation of society, because the myth of the emancipation of 
women under socialism is too deeply rooted in the social and individual consciousness.   132
 
The market and the media help to show women in their places nonchalantly, and sew political 
consciousness in society. Marketing of Kremlin-aligned channels geared toward women makes it 
hard to legitimize women in the spheres of politics and dissent, and distracts from major policy 
needs.  
129 Voronina, “Soviet Patriarchy,” 100. 
130 Sperling, ​Sex, Politics, and Putin​, 309. 
131 ​This is further discussed in 3.4 and the conclusion. 
132 Voronina, “Soviet Patriarchy,” 101. 
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Additionally, gender-based marketing in this context is a distraction from the lack of 
resources allocated to the funding of gender issues, and the high level of disorganization in 
kleptocracy. “You” was created through psychologically persuasive means, utilizing focus 
groups of women and what they would like to see on television. This taps into the political 
consciousness that has been sewn, and exploits the current state of gender politics in Russia to 
market and monetize the lack of inclusion.  
Such a political consciousness has created the space for the prevalence of sexism in 
politics, the giving of birthday calendars of pin-ups to the leader of the country, the lack of any 
policy change in terms of addressing gender inequality, the lack of federal funding for families, 
and the state-sponsored directives to procreate. And in this space, with unitary power, the status 
quo is maintained and proliferated through the media. The takeaway of this, then, is that women 
are cast in submissive roles, either overtly or through the psychology of entrenchment in 
male-controlled societies, which is emboldened by the lack of their representation in the Duma. 
In her influential book, ​Sex, Politics, and Putin, ​Sperling outlines the discrimination in 
parliament, and the roles of women within it. If discrimination was invisible to the Duma 
women, “it had not remained so to Russia’s feminist activists, who saw it as pervasive in the 
spheres of political, economic, social, and personal life.”  Putinist politics on the Duma floor 133
operated with such legitimation strategies, Sperling writes:  
Political legitimation strategies that rely on gender norms include ‘topping,’ or asserting 
masculine dominance over other men, enhancing political authority by claiming the 
sexual allegiance of attractive, feminine women, and undermining opponents’ positions 
by attacking their masculinity or femininity as deviant. These techniques only work 
effectively in a cultural-political context where sexism and homophobia are widely 
accepted or at least a little questioned in public.   134
 
133 Sperling ​Sex, Politics, and Putin, ​169. 
134 ​Ibid. 
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Even though women working in the context of the Russian Duma are “in power,” they are 
working within these contexts which ascribe a dominance and pecking order, with an uneven 
gender balance. Many of the policies adopted in the Duma directly affect women––and are 
stamped by women in performative roles of Putinist allyship. 
The scholar Deniz Kandiyoti offers analysis of this phenomenon in her work, ​Bargaining 
with the Patriarchy​:  
women in areas of classic patriarchy often adhere as long as they possibly can to rules 
that result in the unfailing devaluation of their labor. The cyclical fluctuations of their 
power position, combined with status considerations, result in their active collusion with 
the reproduction of their own subordination. They would rather adopt interpersonal 
strategies to maximize their security through manipulation of the affections of their sons 
and husband.   135
 
Is docility within state power, then, a maximization of security? Certainly those working 
alongside Putin must be docile in their intentions, and ambitious to garner power through their 
associations with him and his Kremlin allies. Women who aligned themselves with Putin, then, 
“through their actions to resist passivity and total male control, became participants with vested 
interests in the system that oppressed them.”  There is a material base to state power held by 136
men; there is no such similar experience for women. These considerations of gender power 
imbalance are deeply rooted, and increased, in the Putinist period.  
Thus, Kandiyoti’s theory is applicable to the picture of Russian gender imbalance today. 
She argues, in her example of certain sub-saharan African societies adopting democracy, that 
“women often resist the process of transition because they see the old normative order slipping 
away from them without empowering alternatives.”  This is also an explanation for the absence 137
135 Deniz Kandiyoti, “Bargaining with Patriarchy” in​ Gender and Society, ​vo. 2 no. 3 (1988): 280. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid, 282. 
 
Goldberg 58 
 
of a cohesive and successful women’s movement during the perestroika period and the “time of 
troubles” under Yeltsin. People were struggling to locate themselves after years of perceived 
Soviet equality and a social welfare system. Intense branding, marketed to a people that has one 
through traumatic regime change, has created political opportunism: it becomes a game of 
loyalties, and a gaming of stability. 
Benefits to ideological docility within the power structure of Duma run with the fabric of 
patriarchal bargaining: Mizulina, for example, gains reliability and reputation through being in 
step with Putinist policy of the moment––it is a strategic, if not outright blatantly opportunistic 
move. This opportunism has been expressed through how Mizulina started out: as a fairly 
progressive senator who opposed war with Chechnya. The Russian politician Boris Nadezhdin 
said to ​Open Democracy​ that “over the years she went with the flow, from Gaidar to Putin. She 
wasn’t the only one, and she feels good about it. She has connections among the ‘strongmen’ 
surrounding Putin, and all this heady brew of Imperial Orthodoxy probably came from them.”  138
In Kandiyoti’s terms, Mizulina’s steps are strategic moves in a system that is only in the recent 
past adopting an illusion of stability. The benefit to docility is job stability.  
When asking the question of why women would forward policies that do not benefit 
major issues that are associated exclusively with their wellbeing: such as access to reproductive 
health centers, equitable pay, and other questions of equitable standing in society, one can look 
to this quote from Kandiyoti: “Patriarchal bargains do no merely inform women’s rational 
choices but also shape the more unconscious aspects of their gendered subjectivity, since they 
permeate the context of their early socialization, as well as their adult cultural milieu.”   139
138 Egor Mostovshchikov, “Yelena Mizulina: the creation of a conservative.” ​Open Democracy, ​May 28, 2015. 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/yelena-mizulina-creation-of-conservative/ 
139 Kandiyoti, “Bargaining with Patriarchy,” 285. 
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Short-term, material interests like social standing and salary take precedence. Kandiyoti 
writes of the presence of passivity within these contexts: “their passive resistance takes the form 
of claiming their half of this particular patriarchal bargain––protection in exchange for 
submissiveness and propriety.”  Protection is granted by docility.  140
Margarita Simonyan is another case study in ideological docillity: the editor-in-chief of 
Russia Today, a state news outlet often described as a “soft-power tool” which was designed to 
improve Russia’s image abroad, also directly benefits from the Putinist structure. Simonyan was 
ranked No. 5 on the Forbes ​2017 Power Women: Most Powerful Women in 
Media/Entertainment, ​right next to popstar Beyoncé Knowles.   141
Journalist Julia Ioffe writes of the docility required to work within the context of the 
Kremlin news pool: “To be picked for the Kremlin press pool is an honor but also a sign of 
trustworthiness. The pool is a place for the most loyal of the loyalists.” This business required 
lenient morals and ideologies: “To be assigned to cover the Russian president, especially for 
television, a reporter has to be absolutely reliable in his docility, and in his ability to ask softball 
questions.”  ​The RT slant is deeply pro-Putin, and evokes a clever human rights rhetoric to 142
qualify the slant in the eye of foreign news. One article discusses the popular movement to 
change heteronormative family terminology, and Putin’s mock of the movement: “While 
Western ​‘human rights’​ groups may be girding their loins to condemn Putin’s remarks as yet 
another example of ​‘oppression’​ in Russia, they should hold their horses before cashing those 
140 Kandiyoti, “Bargaining with Patriarchy,” 283. 
141 “2017 Most Powerful Women in Media/Entertainment,” ​Forbes. ​Accessed April 19, 2020. 
https://www.forbes.com/pictures/59f3a0e84bbe6f37dda13e8e/no-5-margarita-simonyan/#2adfbe4964ba 
142Julia Ioffe, “What is Russia Today?” ​Columbia Journalism Review, ​September/October 2010. 
https://archives.cjr.org/feature/what_is_russia_today.php?page=all&print=true 
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lobbying checks….”  Again, to make up for the lack of gender equality and even rhetorical 143
equality, state-affiliated leaders tout Russian sovereignty and call out the West for hyperbolizing 
oppression and inequality. The RT article continues, ‘That would complicate the virtue-signaling 
morality plays that pay their bills, though, so we shouldn’t hold our breath.” Again arises the 
problem of placating within modern Putinist conservatism, with the means of the media and its 
capacity to incite fear-based opinion and gender anxiety. 
Ultimately, this media serves as an avenue for diverting attention from the real, domestic 
needs at hand. The Kremlin manufactures political power through a theater of external threats 
and Putinist solutions. Inclusion and insistence that women are in fact represented does little to 
hide the overt statistics referenced above. The longitudinal data shows the strong decrease in 
women’s standing in Putin’s power sphere, both locally and federally. The uneven Duma, then, 
is tasked with womens’ public health and economic issues with women only being 
approximately 16% holding seats in the legislature and 17% in higher chambers.   144
 
 
 
 
143 ​“Thanks, but we’ll keep ‘mother’ & ‘father’: Putin rejects politically correct ‘parent #1 & #2’ titles.” ​Russia 
Today, ​November 30, 2019. ​https://www.rt.com/russia/474708-putin-mother-father-parent/  
144Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Percentages of women in national parliaments,” Accessed April 27, 2020. 
https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=3&year=2020 
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 ​Chapter Three: Political Consciousness 
3.1 Commercializing Gender 
Women’s leverage in the labor market requires tradeoffs that provide for upward 
mobility; often entrepreneurship means tapping into male desires. The lack of representation in 
entrepreneurial avenues results in a lack of representation in the political sphere.  In 145
Kandiyoti’s terms, in the context of her patriarchal bargaining argument, there is a tradeoff in 
marrying rich in a gender regime with a major wealth gap. This is the background for the popular 
phenomenon of gold-digging, and becoming a mistress to wealthy men. This is best outlined 
anecdotally in TV producer Peter Pomerantsev’s book, ​Nothing is True and Everything is 
Possible, ​where he recalls producing a reality show called “Gold Digging Academy” for the 
Russian TV channel “TNT.” 
The Gold Digging Academy is one of dozens of these schools in Moscow. One such 
school is the Geisha School, with classes with year-and-a-half wait lists for classes like “How to 
Marry in Three Months,” “Oral Sex for Experts,” and “How to Be Your Man’s Number One 
Lover.”  This all highlights that husband-finding is a competition, and because of the 146
demographic problem, there are many women to one man. Yulia Varra, the instructor at the 
Moscow Geisha school, said to ​Marie Claire ​Magazine, “Relationships are like roulette for 
modern Russian women. They have a lot to win and everything to lose, so they can never afford 
to get complacent.” Some women bring their daughters. Self-help classes and books, by no 
surprise, generate a profit from telling women how to marry rich––rather than become rich 
145 ​Kapoor, “Women in the Duma,” 62.  
146 Abigail Haworth, “Lessons in Love: The Millionaire Hunters,” ​Marie Claire,​ March 31, 2008. 
https://www.marieclaire.com/politics/news/a1324/geisha-school-russia/ 
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themselves. But even some of the women training women to be desirable are unwed: building 
profitable businesses in teaching traits of desirability. 
The popularity of misstressdom and schools where women are taught to land oligarchs 
are not only a pop-culture phenomenon, but a product of political consciousness. This is a way 
out, and a tradeoff: many of these women are from poor families from the provinces, coming to 
Moscow in order to lead a different life.  Many of these women did not have father figures (a 147
universal trope, but problematized by the connotations associated with Russian manhood), and 
seek male protection. Pomerantsev writes that the gold diggers he met were fatherless, and the 
fantasies of finding a “sugar daddy” were intertwined with the fantasy of having a father figure. 
Putin is wrapped up in this example: “All the shirtless photos hunting tigers and harpooning 
whales are love letters to the endless queues of fatherless girls. The President as the ultimate 
sugar daddy, the ultimate protector with whom you can be as ‘behind a stone wall.’”  148
This is one of many explanations; others are the persistent demographic problem in 
Russia, the extreme wealth gap that generates disparity and joblessness, the life expectancy of 
males, and foremost the lack of political conversation and policy about anything beyond the 
traditional marriage and gender identity. Another issue is the added, unspoken requirements for 
women in their fields. Pomeranstev describes the job of translating as a microcosmic example, 
citing that a specific unnamed translation agency looks for women with “no complexes,” 
meaning “code for being prepared to bed the client.”  Sperling references a similar brand of“for 149
hire” ads in newspapers in her 1999 book, ​Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia, 
clarifying that “no complexes” signals “either sex work, or that the woman in question should be 
147 Peter Pomerantsev, ​Nothing is True and Everything is Possible, ​(New York: PublicAffairs, 2015): 10. 
148 ​Ibid,​ ​10. 
149 Ibid, 14. 
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willing to put up with sexual demands by bosses… an institutionalized form of sexual 
harassement.”  150
In the case of the TNT show, there is notorious “matchmaking” with oligarchs, organized 
by Peter Listerman, a self-proclaimed “matchmaker,” but considered a pimp and associated with 
the Jeffrey Epstein sex-trafficking and molestation scandal. He had found teen girls for Epstein, 
and had sent text messages to a 14-year-old model, saying “Hey, Bride-to-be, have you been 
successful?” Listerman is quoted in the tabloid ​Komsomolskaya Pravda​ saying, “My Holywood 
clients and oligarchs are sick of emancipated… women, who resemble robots. Everybody is sick 
of these evil women, they want gentle and romantic!”  151
Another popular TV show was called “Insanely Beautiful,” a game show in which young, 
attractive women are asked trivia and logic questions, and men attempt to guess what the women 
would answer.  The introducer, a woman herself, provided that because the women were 152
beautiful, it complicated their ability to logically answer the questions provided to them.  
The playing field of image-making is inherently skewed by the state-controlled media. 
This serves as one of the many examples of how lack of policy fails a culture in its efforts to 
reduce its problems, and then seeks to ridicule the groups and internalize gender norms. This 
does not generate a result to the demographic problem, nor any of the pronatalist policies for 
women in Russia. Women’s upward mobility is considered as reliant on male power. Image 
holds ground: the wealthy male, and the female who imagines herself rising to luxury, and 
150 Sperling, ​Organizing Women, ​74-75. 
151 Anna Nemtsova, “The Russian Sleazeball Peddling Girls to Billionaires,” The Daily Beast,​ ​July 29, 2019. 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/peter-listerman-the-sleazeball-peddling-russian-girls-to-billionaires 
152 “Bezymno Krasivi, Seria 1,” YouTube, September 1, 2017 ​https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=k1aSZ1kSlso  
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therefore safety are responses to past instability. Such images are projected and validated through 
media, in books, and through culture more generally.  
Even Ksenia Sobchak, an oppositionist presidential candidate in 2018, reality show host, 
blogger and critic of the Kremlin and its media, published her own book on marrying rich, called 
“How to Marry a Millionaire, or Marriage of a Higher Sort.”  This book, co-written with 153
socialite Oksana Robsky, is another one of the how-to guides on marrying rich. It is even from 
the oppositionists like Sobchak that such content is produced.  
These tradeoffs make the Putinist legitimation system work: both as Putin’s masculinist, 
pronatalist legitimation system but also as the mechanism for instilling political consciousness. 
Therefore, lack of coherent policy is not a concern of the government. All may continue as such, 
and is not seen as a problem. The sexualized Putinist pin-ups and the Orthodox Church have 
their differences, but they all play the same game of validation in the Kremlin power machine. 
3.2 Monetizing Inferiority 
As previously discussed, the economic realities of modern Russia have given way to a 
centralization of money in its “controlled democracy.” The system of beliefs in modern Russia 
includes faith in opportunity, which holds that money-making is a realistic prospect that is within 
one’s reach. While this can be true, economic mobility is nearly impossible in a wealth landscape 
where most of the population is living at or below the poverty line.  However, mechanisms of 154
wealth-gleaning in Russia are associated with the state, and general political opportunism. 
Though there are many considerably wealthy actors in Russia who are “apolitical” or faintly 
153 Ksenia Sobchak and Oksana Robski, “Zamuzh za millionera, ili brack vishevo sorta,” Book-online, 
http://book-online.com.ua/read.php?book=4620 
154 Refer to page 51 for poverty data. 
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criticize the system and its leaders, those that do cash out the most are those that align 
themselves with Putinist leadership. 
The dream of Russian wealth is the dream of opulence, success, and freedoms, which is 
why so many of the sites in which women seeking wealthy men (and purportedly wealthy men 
seeking women) find themselves geographically closer to the Kremlin.  
Fabricating propaganda is a maneuver to benefit from government money. Consider 
Krymski Most ​(in English, “Bridge to Crimea. Made With Love!”), a film written by Simonyan. 
The film tells the tale of a romance between a daring bridge-builder and a beautiful young 
archaeologist––while at the same time operating as state propaganda promoting the controversial 
bridge, which happens to be the sum of Putin’s annexation.  The oppositionist Alexei Navalny 155
and his team led an investigation into the allocation of funds for the film, and payments, finding 
that Simoyan went to Alexei Gromov, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, who 
pushed the Ministry of Culture to provide taxpayer money in order to make the movie.  Both 156
Gromov and Simonyan are paid in taxpayer money in their day jobs. The movie cost 100 million 
roubles to shoot (1.34 million USD). Included, Simoyan was paid 9 million roubles for the script 
of ​Bridge to Crimea​ directly to her personal account from the Cinema Foundation.  
Thus, learning how to game the system is learning how to survive in an oligarchical 
economy. The same way in which the Kremlin employs its image-making machine to make 
Putin a brand that people want to subscribe to, the wealthy employ similar tactics, or even align 
themselves with already-present images in the system. In the case of the Kremlin’s women, 
Mizulina brands herself (though coming from a progressive past, advocating for women’s 
155 ​See 2.4 for reference on Simonyan.  
156 Alexei Navalny, “Krimski Most. Ykradeno s lyobvyo!” YouTube, March 24, 2020. 
https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=0LAdAV-jHhw 
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reproductive rights in the Yeltsin years) as a staunch conservative to a dramatic extent––having 
constructed a graveyard for aborted fetuses.  
Thus, good behavior that aligns with the political moment is the way to survive in Russia, 
and performance generates revenue. Women––whether fully convinced by Putin or just trying to 
get by––are aware of this and are able to position themselves to game the system as per rules. 
Though this phenomenon is universal, it holds cultural weight with the performance of Soviet 
and post-Soviet citizenship in Russia. 
3.3 Are Russia’s Female Citizens Passive? 
The political history of women in Russia does not cast them in a passive role, so to call 
them passive in Russia’s contemporary society is simply not enough of an explanation to make 
sense of why progressive gender policy stagnates. Kandiyoti’s theory, that women are not 
passive political actors, but rather they locate themselves in short-term positions of safety in 
patriarchal societies, is key to understanding women’s roles in contemporary Russia. Passivity is 
performance. It is an active choice to participate in one of the gold-digging schools, but is of 
course no locus for change.  
The concept of “women’s roles” in Russia has been constantly in flux––from being 
locked in monasteries during the Rurik dynasty to the reforms of the reign of Peter the Great, 
from the Tsarinas  to Marxist women of the People’s Will who succeeded in toppling the entire 157
status quo. Women’s roles have fluctuated throughout the history of the Soviet Union: women 
157 ​The female tsarinas in chronological order were Ekaterina I (1725-27, in the  wake of Peter the Great), Anna 
Ioannovna (1730-1740), a short reign by Anna Leopoldovna (1740-41, until her deposal by Elizaveta), Elizaveta 
(1741-62), Ekaterina II, also known as Catherine the Great (1762-96).  
 
Goldberg 67 
 
were promised equality, and their efforts were truncated by the rise of Stalin, overtly returned to 
pronatalist values, all the while being touted as emancipated women.  
In the peasantry, there was a saying, “​Muzh zhene otets, zhena muzhu venets​,” meaning 
“A husband is the wife’s father, a wife is the husband’s crowning glory.”  The overarching 158
expectation of women and children was obedience to men, often met with the repercussion of 
violence in the home. The “slave soul” of Russia pertained to women in the household, 
emphasizing the entrenchment of the values which pervade in Russian culture and suggest that 
the woman is at the will of her father and husband. But all the while, there was no passivity; 
there was, rather, careful bargaining for stable roles in society. This is why political opportunism 
is unsurprising, but also provides a possible explanation for why social movements are perceived 
as axiomatic.  
In a society that is ever-changing, and perceived as generally unstable, with a weak leader 
that is touted as a strongman, where poverty is astounding but opulence is the image that 
surrounds the Kremlin, people seek out that opulence for themselves in order to achieve 
proximity to power and an image of themselves as successful. The story of finding stable roles is 
eternal––opulence applies to the human mentality, but also the cultural longing for stability after 
the traumas of regime change. Images of Russian power that proliferate in the media are that of 
extreme, oligarchical opulence, which signals safety.  
While there is a legacy of women choosing stable positions in a generally unstable 
society, there parallels a legacy of performativity toward womens’ issues. The societal 
expectations of women fulfilling certain roles are entrenched; examples of this are the 
158Rancour-Laferriere, “Is the Slave Soul of Russia a Gendered Object?” 134. 
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Brezhnev-era jokes about women feeling overworked with their double burden of labording and 
taking care of their families. These expectations from the selective, brand-based Kremlin, are 
ideas of women that are congruent with the likes of leaders that place women in certain roles. Per 
Connell and Messerschmidt (see 1.5), a leading minority can appear as a majority.  
It is not that Putin is more lax on the home front: it is that the fabric of this kind of 
repression is more ambiguous. Modern authoritarianism in Russia is vastly repressive, 
militaristic, and expansionist. This kind of authoritarianism does not hold its own overt ideology. 
Rather, it is amorphous, and this lack of shape is precisely what lends it the appearance of 
impenetrability. Its ideology is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. The historian Walter 
Lacquer writes, “there are periods in history in which the absence of a doctrine or belief system 
can be tolerated, at least temporarily, whereas during others it will be unthinkable.”  But as 159
time goes on with the same leadership, “a process of routinization sets in, in which the demand 
for change becomes intense and frequent.” This is similar to what Russia has been seeing with 
the massive protests in major Russian cities, demanding fair elections, and the work of activists 
nationwide.  
United Russia, the now-dissolved party which propped up Putin, had a manifesto, written 
in 2003, that carried language with no overt meaning or goals. It had no ideology, but rather 
language that suggested a binary between the party and the current state of affairs when it was 
written: “Democracy or authoritarianism? The market or regulation? Openness or closure of the 
country?” and continued “Decisive political language and aims should be focused on real 
problems… We plan to become the party of Russian national success… We believe in ourselves 
159 Walter Lacquer, ​Putinism: Russia and Its Future with the West, ​(New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2015): 158. 
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and in Russia!”  There was no real party ideology, but there was money and bureaucrats that 160
could prop up the party: “It was a party of bureaucrats, conformists, and opportunists,” writes 
Andrew Jack in his book, ​Inside Putin’s Russia. ​“Even those advising it seemed cynical about 
the whole exercise.”   161
Putin dissolved his cabinet in 2020, and appointed Mikhail Mishustin––the former head 
of Russia’s federal tax service––as his prime minister, with unanimous approval by United 
Russia. The constitutional changes that were cited as the reason for this move would further 
centralize Putin’s power and ability to stay in power.  Overall, the party was weak, and now the 162
power is further centralized, and machismo remains in the seats of high office, while gender 
policy stagnates. 
But this is all a product of the Putin package. On the outside, he is losing his base. As of 
April 23, 2020, Putin’s popularity is at an all time low in the past six years. According to a poll 
by the Levada Center, Putin’s approval rating is at 63%.  This is a large drop from his 83% 163
approval after the annexation of Crimea. The Levada Center also ran a survey from March 
19-25, 2020, asking people about their opinions of the Russian political system, asking if the 
center of power should remain as it is or if there ought to be new people in power, and most 
chose the latter.  The response to the publication of these statistics was controversy over their 164
even being published. ​Vedomosti,​a Russian paper, produced infighting when journalist Ksenia 
Boltskaya published the study by the Levada Center, and the new Editor-in-Chief Andrei 
160 Andrew Jack, ​Inside Putin’s Russia, ​(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 229. 
161 Ibid, 229. 
162 ​Colin Dwyer, “Russia’s Government Resigns as Putin Moves to Change the Constitution,” ​NPR, ​January 15, 
2020. 
163 Levada Center, “Indicators.” Accessed April 23, 2020. ​https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/ 
164 ​Ibid. 
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Shmarov deleted it. Boltskaya used the app Telegram to alert people and receive outside media 
attention on this matter.  ​The Moscow Times​ reported that Shmarov “banned articles that cite 165
surveys from Russia’s last remaining polling agency… claiming that the orders came from the 
Kremlin.”  166
At the time of this writing, the Kremlin is seeking to gather control of these new statistics 
while the country and its markets grapple with the effects of the novel coronavirus pandemic. 
Revenue in the Russian Federation is down 90%, and a petition for aid, launched on March 24, to 
small businesses has resulted in 347,177 signatures and counting.  The original package for 167
April and May was to be a stimulus equating to only $160 per person. ​Time ​magazine reported 
that a protest broke out in the southern Vladikavkaz region of 2,000 people, angry “over job 
losses and a lack of clear information.”  Putin and his administration were unprepared in facing 168
the pandemic, according to the ​Time ​report. The situation has his political popularity very low as 
he takes refuge in his country home. His past crowning achievements are now rendered 
unimportant, and Putin, as of April 27, has only appeared on television four times to address the 
public. As of April 27, Russia has ranked 9th most affected by the pandemic, surpassing China in 
cases and deaths.  169
As economic and public health instability ravages Russian citizens, gender imbalance 
becomes further exacerbated. With upward mobility already difficult to achieve in Russia’s 
165 Telegram, Ksenia Boltskaya. April 22, 2020. ​https://t.me/ksenyaboletskaya/1138  
166 ​“Leading Russian Paper Vedemosti’s New Editor Bans Putin Criticism.” ​The Moscow Times, ​April 23, 2020. 
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/04/23/leading-russian-paper-vedomostis-new-editor-bans-putin-criticism-a
70075 
167 ​Change.org, “Poderzhite polygodovoe obnovlenie nalogov dlya malovo i srednego biznesa,” March 24, 2020. 
https://tinyurl.com/ycwysqyp  
168 Madeline Roache, “Where’s Putin? Russia’s President Stays Out of Sight as Coronavirus Hits Economy.” ​Time, 
April 24, 2020. ​https://time.com/5827078/russia-putin-coronavirus-economy/ 
169 Andrei Nikerichev, “Coronavirus in Russia: The Latest News.” ​The Moscow Times, ​April 27, 2020. 
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/04/27/coronavirus-in-russia-the-latest-news-april-27-a69117 
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economic system, women face an extreme challenge to place themselves in this exceptionally 
tumultuous political moment. With the legacy of the economic challenges during perestroika and 
the Yeltsin-era reforms that exacerbated rampant nationwide poverty, women, again, are placed 
in a transitional position which tasks them to seek meager relief packages. This all harks back to 
the periods from which Putin’s supporters sought refuge from, finding illusory safety in their 
leader’s strong-man image.  
3.4 Alternative Masculinities 
To talk about these phenomena without addressing the very key element of social change 
is a miss. Or, at least, the importance of youth culture. Younger and millenial Russians have seen 
regime change and Putinism, and are not swayed by the same longing for stability as their elders. 
The crux for change lies, in my belief, in the hands of the people who are at the forefront of 
change in Russia in activism that holds the state, the Orthodox Church, and the oligarchy 
accountable.  
The similarities between informal social action groups in contemporary Russia and the 
dissidents of the Brezhnev and Krushchev eras are vast. Generational sociologist Hillary 
Pilkington writes that “where gender is brought into the youth debate at all at this abstract level, 
it is in order to give an added moral dimension to the symbolic role youth plays for society in 
general.”   170
Consider Eric Bronza, a St. Petersburg based artist who makes art that challenges the 
state. He told me that with the given repercussions the government has taken against past 
170 Hillary Pilkington. ​Gender, Generation and Identity in Contemporary Russia. ​London: Routledge Press, 1996. 
3-4. 
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dissident groups, such groups have been hesitant to come to the fore as an entity. But Bronza 
practices acts of dissent to what he calls the “beautification” of things––the constant industrial 
improvements being made by the government, often in conjunction with the wealthy contractors 
working with the city. Bronza’s exhibits and performances, most notably “Nobody Loves Russia 
More Than Me,” features a live performance of him in a bathtub, surrounded by dirt, and him 
ultimately covering himself in the dirt.  Bronza tells me that because of the way in which the 171
government has chased out certain dissident art groups, such as Pussy Riot and ​Art Group Voina 
(meaning War), like groups are afraid to come to the fore: “There is basically no action, people 
are afraid to sit in jail.” But this is not to say people are doing nothing. He tells me, “I decided to 
revise these traditions in a light form,” doing street graffiti, painting a coat with the words 
171 Photo courtesy of Eric Bronza. 
 
Goldberg 73 
 
“Putin, Go Away” under a spray-painted Russian flag and walking through the metro, and 
holding the “Nobody Loves Russia More Than Me” exhibit.  172
This is to say that dissent under the repressive state is not gone even though groups are 
persecuted by the state. Dissent takes another form, rooted inside the individual; not unlike the 
beginnings of the Helsinki Watch Groups in the late Soviet era. Except the contemporary toolbox 
contains the internet, the limited power of organizing and self-publishing, and relative 
accessibility of international attention––something that the dissidents, smuggling ​samizdat​ with 
the statistics of political prisoners did not have in their disposal to find other like-thinking 
people. The abilities of people to convey their needs through the internet are something that the 
dissidents could not have imagined. The scope of dissent now is much larger; but is dependent 
on the mobilization of opposition.  
3.5 A Playbook for Change 
Is the status quo unshakable? Or is there a pathway to changing it? Putin’s administration 
has been stagnantly in power for twenty years, and there is no cohesive movement except the 
informal organizations that have been advocating for change on the ground level, sparking 
protests.  
First, grassroots movements are, and will continue to be, the most important nexus for 
change in the fight for change in today’s Russia. Dissident movements start out small, as 
historians know from the Helsinki Watch Group, even under the repressive Brezhnev era. 
Bronza, saying that though people do not seem to be gathering in oppositionist art groups 
anymore, illustrates that there is hope in individual acts such as lone protesters holding placards 
172 ​Eric Bronza, Facebook message to author, April 4, 2020. 
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of political prisoners in parks, artists that tell a story about their experience of Russia through a 
critical lens. Bronza puts this to action himself, with graffiti and exhibits that challenge the 
status-quo of Putin’s Russia. Though people are scared to speak out, does not mean they will not.  
Second, the independent media, though heavily repressed and challenged by means 
diffused by the government, will be key in those understanding their own dissent. The Navalny 
YouTube Channel develops well-produced media with evidence on all kinds of Kremlin 
corruption, thoroughly researched and explained clearly. As of 2020, Navalny’s YouTube 
channel has 3.4 million followers, with video views ranging from 2 million to 6 million on 
average.  Ksenia Sobchak––the author of ​How to Marry a Millionaire, ​see 3.2––also has her 173
own popular internet following, though her internet brand is not solely focused on oppositionist 
politics, rather bringing various people in for interviews in order to deliver a wide range of 
media––famously with RT Simonyan walking out of her interview when challenged on her role 
as a propagandist. Sobchak has 1.4 million subscribers, and her videos range from 1 million to 6 
million views. Media like theirs is key in mobilizing social movements; which they have. Both 
Navalny and Sobchak ran their own presidential campaigns in 2018. Navalny was detained by 
authorities  at an anti-Putin protest of 2,000 people. Satellite protests happened nationwide on 174
the same day, as is now a trend with oppositionist protests. The internet media serves as a tool 
for inspiring and gathering civil society, while state media seeks to spin the facts. Additionally, 
this proliferates role models beyond Putin and the images that surround his party. Navalny and 
Sobchak both have their own carefully crafted brands.  
173Alexei Navalny, YouTube page. ​https://www.YouTube.com/user/NavalnyRu/featured 
174 Marc Bennetts, “Alexei Navalny detained at anti-Putin protest in Moscow,” The Guardian, January 29, 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/russian-police-raid-alexi-navalnys-office-on-day-of-anti-putin-ralli
es 
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Third, the goals of participatory gender budgeting––experimented on local levels of 
government but met with by officials with ambivalence ––can be met through active 175
engagement of those values on the corporate level, especially in corporations with female CEOs. 
Though it has tried and failed at the public government level from disorderly offices,  there is 176
no reason––beyond entrenched notions of why it cannot proliferate in the private, corporate 
level.  
Finally, I suggest that there is an inroad through performance. This is the approach to 
combating Putinism through the performance of compliance. This is what was done, initially, in 
the formation of the Helsinki Watch Group as an uninvited group of assistance to the Soviet 
Union. As Putin’s fight with NGOs in Russia seeks out institutions that wish to hold Putinism 
accountable, there is a final possibility that small groups can form which define themselves as 
assistance groups to the implementation of laws but are in fact operations which are meant to 
confront the cult of Putinism through the means of independent media, grassroots organizing, 
and public oversight. Taking the constitution, the laws, and international human rights 
agreements, and insisting on their proper implementation is a way to hold Putinism accountable 
even in its most egregious manifestations. This would be the appropriate lesson from the human 
rights movement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 ​Discussed in 2.3. 
176 Zakirova, “Gender Budgeting,” 206 
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Conclusion 
The current era––in which people who do not fit into the Putinist mold are excluded and 
persecuted; in which the government holds families sovereign but seeks their compliance with 
faulty policy, social norms, and calls to procreate; in which interventionism takes on a domestic 
meaning––has its own grim effect on political representation and consciousness. The Kremlin 
seeks to curb social movements and notions of civil society beyond the state. In my interview 
with perestroika feminist Valentina Konstantinova, she illustrated this phenomenon;  
The trouble with the women's movement, and probably the democratic movement, is that 
there is no continuity. There is no continuity of tradition. It is clear that there are reasons 
for this caused by totalitarian structures and totalitarian consciousness before perestroika. 
Have women become more active in politics? I think that in official politics, at the 
decision-making level, no. But they are active in informal groups and movements.  177
 
Konstantinova explains that rather than civil society being a constitutional given, discontent with 
the government breeds civil society. The fight has always been grassroots: in the past, small 
movements organized around specific issues, and larger movements organized around discontent 
over the larger issue of authoritarianism after being propelled forth by these small movements. 
This legacy continues today, and change generates from the grassroots level, while the Kremlin 
seeks to mitigate civil society. 
In the course of my research, I examined the papers of a well-known dissident and human 
rights activist, Elena Bonner, which are preserved at Harvard University’s Houghton Library 
Archive, and belong to the time of the Soviest dissident movement of the 1970s. Bonner’s 
archive contained small cards with names of political prisoners and their addresses.  These 178
177 Valentina Konstantinova,  Facebook message to author, November 11, 2019. 
178 ​Index cards with the names of political prisoners, 1975, Box 15, Folder 34, Elena Bonner Papers, Harvard 
University Archive, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. 
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were to be smuggled across borders for the cause of publicizing names and holding the Soviet 
government accountable; attempting to halt the repressive punishment systems for dissenting 
thinkers and their relatives. Generating change came from small efforts like the listing and 
smuggling of names across borders––names of dissidents such as Dr. Sergei Kovalyov and 
geologist-turned-dissident Malva Landa.  
Here is where the efforts of the dissidents and today’s oppositionists parallel: the power 
of self-publishing. ​Samizdat, ​the term for self-published, individually distributed writings and 
information holds weight even in today’s Russia. This is what Navalny and other independent 
media wielders achieve; generating audiences in the millions. All the while, they expose 
government corruption and mobilize thousands to protest their own dissatisfaction––the internet 
becomes a powerful tool for the opposition.  
This is why the dissident movement of the 70s is relevant to this discussion. Putinism has 
been in place, and seeks to remain in place, yet many are dissatisfied––and organize be it in 
protests both sanctioned and not sanctioned. But the protests of the 70s were those of small 
groups––numbers now estimate in the thousands. The Levada Center study and the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union data  show discontent––which is why Putin’s regime seeks to 179
suppress the publication of any data indicating discontent in the media. These numbers are a 
depiction of truth: people are tired of Putin’s governance.  
But where there is a landscape for truth there is a looming reality. The current freedom of 
the internet, though powerful, may be temporary. The Kremlin has been strategically putting 
together regulations which would give the government autonomy to disconnect Russia’s 
179 ​Refer to page 49 for the IPU data, and to page 68 for the Levada Center study.  
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population from the global internet––meaning, websites which connect people internationally 
would no longer be accessible, and the Kremlin could access encrypted conversations, as well as 
citizens’ personal data.  The Kremlin seeks to ‘localize’ data, to keep it from the international 180
sphere.  This would be a blow to the international transparency generated by the power of the 181
global internet. 
Mechanisms for change, however, have been crafted without the internet in the past and 
can, again, achieve their goals and mobilize actors through other means. As Konstantinova 
noted, informal groups and movements exist––be it under the controversial title of NGO or 
not––that generate change on various levels within the administration. 
All the while, the Kremlin advertises ideas which advocate one’s political monogamy 
through the infusion of gender norms into the political conversation, deploying ideas of how to 
be. Moscow, like any center of power, locates its’ sycophants and directs its’ power-holders 
around the Kremlin. Within that center of unitary power, the conversation about gender is 
one-sided, coming from an administration that seeks to convey strict gender norms and sexualize 
womens’ support; of monogamous political loyalty. 
Gender-normative discourse reinforces discrimination––and is a tool to alienate political 
pluralism, as it reinforces its’ in-groups and out-groups. The somewhat stale Putin brand 
continues; but brand-builders outside of the state models harness power, and like the dissidents 
of the Soviet era, spark change through their own brands of thinking. 
180 Justin Sherman, “Russia’s Domestic Internet is a Threat to the Global Internet.” ​Slate, ​October 24, 2019. 
https://slate.com/technology/2019/10/russia-runet-disconnection-domestic-internet.html 
181 ​Justin Sherman, “Russia’s ‘Data Localization’ Efforts May Guide Other Governments.” ​Defense One, ​January 
13, 2020. 
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/01/russias-data-localization-push-may-guide-other-governments/162380/ 
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The case of Russia is not a hopeless one. However entrenched it may seem, the Putin 
regime is very fragile––thus it is manicured and fibbed through the media. Image-making is a 
response to lack of substance, and thus fills the empty space where policy should be. There is 
room for significant change in Russia, in terms of women’s policy under the banner of the 
Kremlin. On the ground level, opposition requires maneuvering through the weeds of 
state-crafted political consciousness. 
There is a contemporary Russian band that plays secret shows, following a longstanding 
affinity for the dissidents’ kitchen concerts, where music icons like Boris Grebenshikov and 
Vladimir Vysotsky made their name. The band is called IC3PEAK––pronounced ​icepick​, and 
they mobilize, like Pussy Riot, through intense music and art that challenges all social norms, 
operating outside of the Putinist sex-appeal landscape. Their shows are mostly attended by 
adolescent and young-adult women. Their songs express dismay with the system; they play as 
long as they can at underground music venues before local authorities come and break up the 
event.  Their videos are rich with powerful optics  of Anastasia Kreslina and Nikolay 182 183
Kostlylev, eating raw meat by Lenin’s Tomb in Red Square, dominantly sitting on the shoulders 
of riot police in front of Lubyanka prison, and pouring kerosene on herself in front of the Russian 
White House building. In ​Smerti bolshe net,​ (meaning “Death No More”), with 42 million views 
on YouTube, Anastasia sings: 
I pour kerosene on my eyes. 
Let it all burn. 
All of Russia is watching me,  
Let it all burn.  
 
182 Andrew Roth, “Even a half-finished show is a Victory,” ​The Guardian, ​December 12, 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/12/were-not-scared-bands-defy-russian-crackdown-on-political-music 
183 Photo still from ​Smerti Bolshe net. ​https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBG3Gdt5OGs 
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Kostylev throws a match, and the duo vanishes. Of the video, Kreslina says: “It’s a descriptive 
video, we’re not revealing anything new in it. We’re just saying out loud what people would like 
to say but are afraid to. We’re describing the state of mind of a person of our generation.”  184
Online, millions watch. At venues, both the artists and their fans risk arrest. Regardless of one’s 
affinity with the music itself, theirs is a massive display of artistic expression intertwined with 
critical thought, something that, as the ​samizdat ​and Helsinki Watch era have demonstrated, can 
be dismissed only at one’s peril. Everybody, including the Kremlin, listens. 
 
 
 
184 Lucian Kim, “Young Russian Musicians Struggle Under Government Scrunity.” ​NPR, ​January 17, 2019. 
https://www.npr.org/2019/01/17/685973630/young-russian-musicians-struggle-under-government-scrutiny 
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